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This paper developed from the topic considered in the 
third chapter--the Anglo-American good offices mission to 
France in 1958, headed up by Robert Murphy of the United 
States. It was a mission that has received only passing 
attention by most commentators on American and French affairs 
if they mention it at all. Why then give it any special 
attention here? There are several reasons that one ma.y want 
to recall the Murphy-Beeley trip. As the last major diplo­
mati~ exchange with France during the Fourth Republic, it 
emphasizes the degree to which Fr9nch-American relations had 
disintegrated before de Gaulle returned to public office. It 
indicates as well the sources of French hostility at that 
time. In both cases, an attempt has been made here to cor­
rect misjudgements which Americans have tended to make: the 
first a misjudgement which still seems to persist, that the 
history of Franco-American discord begins and ends with 
de Gaulle;. the second a contention consistently put forward 
by government officials at the time and by Murphy in partic­
ular, that French hostility to United States policy emanated 
.entirely from Communist quarters. Evidence to the contrary 
in this last case is overwhelming. While hostility was in 
2 
evidence on the extreme Left, it was primarily individuals 
and parties on the kight and Right-Center who lead the 
opposition, and I can only conclude that Murphy and other 
leaders in Washington were more concerned with perpetuating 
a myth than with facing honestly the real reasons for French 
despair. France was discovering that she existed in an 
American world and it was not a pleasant revelation. Yet 
Washington would not admit to this general French concern, 
and it ignored, for example, de Gaulle's warning in 1958 
.tbat NATO would have to be revamped. The United States 
seems to have been so convinced th~t hostility to its pol­
icies could only be the result of Communist agitation or of 
pers~nal hostility (i.e., de Gaulle) that it remained blithe­
fully ignorant of the antipathy converging from diverse 
sources. Such a widespread opposition was incompatible with 
a conspiracy interpretation of the sources of hostility. 
Thus, aspects of the 1958 good offices mission go 
beyond the specific event and my main concern is with these 
broader implications of the mission for Franco-American re­
lations. Unfortunately, the mi~sion reflects a poverty of 
American diplomacy, both in style and content, that in many 
ways appears typical of the Communist-obsessed postwar 
American foreign policy rather than an aberration. I attempt 
to analyze this situation in the latter part of Chapter Three 
and in Chapter Four • 
..............----------------­
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The second chapter, emphasizing French affairs in par­
ticular, discusses the development of Franco-American rela­
tions up to 1958. The war and the period that followed 
brought a shift in relations between the two countries--from 
one of a traditional, nodding friendship before the war to 
one of real involvement afterward. One might say that re­
lations began with the war. The French came to understand 
American attitudes and (probably to a lesser extent) 
Americans the views of the French, and it cannot be said 
that the two countries were as charmed with one another as 
they might have anticipated. The early postwar period was 
one of adjustment for both countries. Roles had shifted: 
the United States had been brought to the forefront while 
France had virtually been reduced to insignificance. It 
~as from these positions that France and America began their 
first close peacetime association. 'The United States had 
only to learn to accept a position of world leadership, but 
France could not forget the role of leadership which had been 
hers and could not rest until that position had been re­
gained. Conflict would unavoidably have followed a policy 
of the United States vis-~-vis France which. assumed the new 
positions of France and the United States to represent the 
postwar status guo, which assumed American leadership and 
French subservience to that leadership, not for a specific 
period but indefinitely. And that is just the policy 
Washington unerringly pursued. 
CHAPTER II 
FRANCE AND THE MODERN CHALLENGE 
"The stalemate societyll is a label that has been used 
by Stanley Hoffmann to describe the equilibrium of the Third 
Republic. Not by chance or by default was Parliament 
"supreme but immobile"--this was the first political system 
since the Revolution that had effectively adapted itself to 
French society, striking a balance between those who per­
ennially stressed the need for authority and those who 
expressed fear of authority. "What the stalemate society 
needed was state protection, not domination; it wanted an 
instrument, not a master. . . . It was a state wedded to 
the social status gU2 ••• ,,1 
Maintenance of the status guo in Francets economic 
and international positions was a prerequisite for the sur­
vival of the stalemate society; but in the period between the 
two world wars, shifts in both areas brought about its 
disintegration. With the growth of industry and the 
lStanley Hoffmann, et al., "Paradoxes of the French 
Political Community," In Search of France (New York: Harper 
~ Row, Publishers, 1963), pp. 3, 14, 15. See also David· 
Thomson, Democracy in France Since 1870 (4th ed.; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 191-92. 
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problems created by the depression, dynastic and clerical 
. were rep1aced b-y econom1C. and f' . 1 1ssues.. 2 The1ssues 1nanC1a 
Left, by taking an active part in numerous strikes, mainly 
over wages and working conditions, disrupted the Center 
coalition. Dissenters trom French parliamentarism rapidly 
grew in strength. Anti-Republican forces on the Right which 
had pr~viously tolerated the parliamentary regime "now merged 
their anti-Communism into their anti~Republicanism, and began 
to clamour tor a more authoritarian regime_H) On the Left, 
where more state planning and greater economic socialization 
was demanded, calls for a stronger government were repeated. 4 
During the interwar period, one problem eclipsed all 
others in the area of foreign affairs, made all others 
trivial by comparison, and that was "the German problem." 
~he First World War, far from solving the German problem, 
made it ultimately more acute. 
G ., .. (T)he old balance of power,·which formerly 
did something to restrain Germany, had broken down. 
Russia had withdrawn; Austria-Hungary had vanished. 
Only France and Italy remained, both inferior in 
man-power and still more i~ economic resources, 
both exhausted by the war. 
2Thomson, Democ~acy in France Since 1870, p. 182. 
)~., p. 195. 
4aoffmann, "Paradoxes of the French Political 
Community," pp. )0-31. 
5A• J.P. Taylor, l.he OrigiI!.L.9f the Second World War 
(2nd. ed.; Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 
1961), pp. 28-29. 
6 
Although greatly damaged by war and limited for the present 
by the Treaty of Versailles, Germany nevertheless remained 
the greatest power in Europe. While France looked for 
security, the Americans and the British, "inclined to think 
that they had done their work,,,6 withdrew their troops from 
France and reduced their armies to the peacetime level. 
American withdrawal would have mattered less had Great 
Britain, France and Italy stayed in agreement. But Italy 
tailed to contribute what little she might have, and 
Britain, while remaining closely associated with France, 
disagreed with her on the potential threat of Germany. 
They (the British) tended to regerd talk of the 
German danger as historical romanticism, which 
indeed it was in the immediate present. The French 
ob'session wi th se~uri ty seemed not so much ex.agger­
ated as mistaken.of 
With that analysis, British sentiment in the thirties moved 
back towards isolationism. 
Forced in this manner to single-handedly follow a 
policy of keeping European peace, France assumed an undertak­
ing she could not fulfill. Neither in spirit nor in military 
strength was she up to the task. The tensions created by 
these internal and exte~nal developments ha~ several divisive 
effects on France, all of which contributed to the breakdown 
of the Republic and helped to prepare France for defeat in 
1940. 
6Ibid., p. 34. 

7 Ibid ., p. 38. 
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First, the depression and the collapse of Versailles 
-
shook the French loose from their general complacency and 
prompted a widespread questioning of France's power, her 
claim to status and her traditional values. Both on the 
Left and on the Right, many became convinced that war would 
only destroy or further weaken a nation that had already 
fallen behind the stream of history, and they took refuge in 
pacifism. In the face of overcommitment, French public 
opinion, introverted from the beginning, turned defensive; 
the defensive posture of the Maginot Line stood as a military 
symbol for the wider mental outlook of all those who feared 
a permanent decline of t~e French position. Here, too, 
German reparation payments must b~ counted as a symbol. 
France got virtually nothing out of reparations but sus­
picion, moral blame, and international hostility for having 
ever demanded them. To this, the French reacted by losing 
faith in their leaders and in themselves. "Reparations 
fixed the French in an attitude of sullen, but rather hope­
less, resistance • • •• (They) did almost as much damage 
to democracy in France as in Germany itself. nS 
STaylor, The Origins of the Second World War, pp. 48­
49. On the questioning of values, see Hoffmann, "Paradoxes 

of the French Political Community," pp. 24-26, 30-32; 

B. Stuart Hughes, The Obstructed Path: French Social 

Thought in the Years of Desperation. 1930-1960 (New York: 

Harper & Row, Publishers, 1969), 2-6, 8, 15-18. On the 

extent of introversionism and pacifism, see Jean-Baptiste 

'Duroselle, 	"Changes in French Foreign Policy Since 1945," 
in In Search ~f France, pp. 306-18. 
8 
Secondly, the political system fell into confusion. 
The National Assembly bad the power to deal with the problems 
that arose, but 
most French parties had not been created around the 
issue of economic and social balance or around for­
eign affairs, since these had been the pillars of 
French consensus. Consequently, when they became 
the major political issues, the parties proved both 
incapable of agreeing on coherent measures and un­
able to get their own members to agree. 9 
Finally, lacking the spirit and the military strength 
to keep peace in Europe, France turned to Britain. "The main 
feature of French foreign policy from 1936 onwards was its 
complete subservience to British policy.,,10 Was this a wise 
policy? A. J. P. Taylor argues throughout The Origins of the 
Second World War that Hitler had no intention of making war 
with the West. His argument is reinforced by an economist, 
Burton H. Klein, whose statistics in Germany's Economic Pre-= 
parations for War demonstrate that Hitler's rearmament pro­
gram did not proceed at anything like the rate that has 
usually been assumed or that Hitler himself claimed. Rather 
than planning a war with the West, they believe Hitler 
expected to extend German territory piecemeal through & 
series of small wars in the East. Above all, he intended 
to succeed without provoking a great war. "The wa.r of 1939,11 
9Hoffmann, IIParadoxes ,of the French Political Commu­
nity," p. 25. See also ~., pp. 21, 26; Thomson, Democracy 
in France Since 1870, pp. 182~84, 191-92. 
10Thomson, Democracy in France Since 1870,. p. 205. 
9 
Taylor claims, "far from being premeditated, was a mistake, 
the result on both sides of diplomatic blunders."11 
It was Britain's revolutionary new policy of solid 
and indiscriminate alliance with Poland--and this commitment 
made without first consulting France12 __that caught Hitler 
by surprise and left him with little choice but to advance 
on the Yest. As for France, she was dragged into war in the 
wake of British decisions. 
The Third Republic had not wanted war, but its leaders 
~ere unable to develop a policy for maintaining peace and 
they were equally incapable of developing a realistic 
strategy of defense. The military defeat was above all a 
defeat in strategy; only in the number of planes did Germany 
hold a great material advantage over France. 13 This kind of 
defeat Charles de Gaulle had foreseen. In his most important 
book on military strategy, Vers l'Armte de M~tier,published 
in 1934 while he was secretary-general of the National 
11Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, p. 212 • 
.	See also ~., pp. 210-11, 280, 284-86; Burton H. Klein," 
German's Economic Pre arations for War (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1959 , pp. 3-27. 
12Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, p. 205. 
13Duroselle, "Changes in French Foreign Policy Since 
1945," p. 323: "The number of planes at the disposal of the 
state in 1937 was 450 for France as opposed to 4,320 for 
" Germany. tI Duroselle takes this quote from Alfred Sauvy in 
LtExpress, April 20, 1960. See also Klein, Preparations for 
War, pp. 17-18, 19-20; The War l·femoirs of Charles de Gaulle: 
The Call to Honour, 1940-1942, trans. by Jonathan Griffin, 
I (New York: The Viking Press, 1955), 36." 
10 
Defense Council in Paris, de Gaulle argued that an immobile 
defensive strategy would not be the character of the next 
war. His plan called for a mechanized force of tanks and 
planes.capable of rapid and direct attack. Although aware 
of de Gaulle's book, the French High Command did not share 
his viewpoint since it went in diametric opposition to the 
entire'defensive strategy which they had planned for France. 
Unfortunately his book was more successful in Germany where 
Hitler had it read to him and insisted that all his chief 
advisors study it.14 
Marc Bloch, the French histo~ian who participated in 
the war and wrote of the defeat soon afterward, saw the 
failure of French strategy as a sign of a more serious in­
tellectual failing in leadership: "Our leaders, or those 
who acted for them, were incapa.ble of thinking in terms of a 
~ war. In other words, the German triumph was, essential­
ly, a triumph of intellect--and that is what makes it so 
peculiarly serious.,,15 This was de Gaulle's conclusion as 
well when he wrote that tithe metronome of the French High 
Command never failed to beat several measures behind.,,16 
14Dorothy Shipley White, Seeds of Discord: De Gaulle, 
Pree France and the Allies (Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press, 1964), pp. 11-33. 
15Marc Bloch, Strange Defeat, trans. by Gerard Hopkins 
(New York: Y. Y. Nort.on & Company, Inc., 1968), p. 36. 
16Charles de Gaulle, Memoires de Guerre, I, 34-35, 
quoted in White, Seeds of Discord, p. 46. 
11 
x. J, j 
Unquestionably the war years were a divisive experience 
for the French. Yithinthese divisions, wer~ there any 
significant forces of unity and rejuvenation to be found 
that had been sorely lacking eyen before the war a,I1d that 
would be necessary for France to adapt herself to the postwar 
,world? This is an important but also difficult question. 
It is hard to contend with because, as Alexander Werth 
suggests, "Few things are more difficult to decipher than the 
minds of Frenchmen during the 1940-4: period'." Mental reser­
vations were bound to be held in check, perspectives shifted, 
and moreover the period has been shrouded in myth. Resis­
tance men magnified the role of the underground and gladly 
endorsed the myth that nearly all of France was rlsistante 
in 1944. Later the Right unfairly "debunked" the myth 
through their treatment of the French Forces of the 
Interior. 17 
The Vichy regime cannot take credit for unifying 
French attitudes. Rather, a trend in just the opposite 
direction is indicated by the course of events. In the first 
shock of disaster the parliamentary government of the Third 
Republic seemed finally discredited and the anti-Republicans 
of the Right won an easy victory. Marshall pttain, whose 
reputation was based upon military achievements in the First 
17Alexander Werth, France. 1940-1955;(London: Robert 
Hale, Ltd., 1956), pp. 4, 7. 
12 
World War, became the last regularly appointed cabinet head 
of the Third Republic, and he was immediately endowed "with 
n18practically unlimited monarchical powers. Among the Vichy 
politioians, as well as among Frenchmen in general, his 
support was virtually unanimous in July 1940. "Almost 
every parliamentarian was ready to entrust France to pttain 
at least for the immediate future, and many were prepared to 
see a permanent shift to authoritarian government. n19 
Little sympathy was to be found for the system responsible 
for failure; even the resistance movements voiced a common 
critique of French parliamentarism.~O 
But unity passed quickly. The French had understood at 
first only the need for a strong leader but soon they became 
more discriminating. The famous meeting between pltain and 
Bitler marks the beginning of a steady decline in Vichy sup­
port and a continual rise of those who could no longer accept 
the Marshallts compromise. 21 
Neither can Vichy claim to have maintained inner unity, 
to have held to a single set of objectives vis-~-vis Germany 
181bid., 32, 39-40. 
19GordoD Wright, France in Modern Times: 1760 to the 
Present (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1960), p. 511. 
See also Werth, France, 1940-1955, pp. 6, 30-32. 
20Hottmann, "Para.doxes ot the French Political 
Community , It pp. 30-31 •. 
21 Duroselle, "Changes in French Foreign Policy Since 
1945," p. 326. 
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during the war period. Seyera1 phases are distinguishable. 
Before December 1940, while Vice~Premier Pierre Lave1 was in 
control, the keynote was defeatism and some collaboration. 
Between February 1941 and April 1942, under Admiral Jean 
Dar1an's direction, Vichy worked to eliminate all remaining 
traces of the parliamentary Republic through the "National 
Revolution" program, and to turn France into Germany's 
closest ally. Dar1an "reached--or rather, tried to reach-­
the peak of Franco-German co11aboration.,,22 After April, 
vith the new balance created by American entry into the war, 
Vichy--once again under Lave1 f s contro1--retreated toward 
attentisme and continued in that policy until January 1944 
when Nazi collaborators from Paris were forced into the 
Government. Thereafter Vichy represented the forces of pro­
Germanism and opposition to it hardened. 23 
The Vichy regime, rather than uniting France through' 
the "National Revolution," divided it and drove support 
away. "There was a steady drift away of national opinion and 
~ee1ing from defeatism and reluctant collaboration towards 
attentisme, and from attenti~me towards resistance."24 
As a political body, the French Resistance never 
achieved the structural u.ni ty of Vichy. Most of the 
r 
22Werth, France, 1940-195l, p. 79. 

23Thomson, Democracy in France Since 1870, pp. 217-20. 





movements were originally free of politics, beginning as 
spontaneous resistance to the enemy, and that is what they 
remained as far as the actual combatants were concerned. 
Leaders of the various movements, however, gradually dirtied 
themselves with politics. By the end of 1942 it appears 
that the Communist organized National Front was attempting 
to coordinate resistance movements under its own leadership •
. 
This they were unable to do, but Gaullist agents succeeded 
where Communist efforts failed when all major underground 
movements and political parties were welded into a nation­
wide federation, the National Resistance Council, on May 27, 
1943. Despite the continuance of occasional friction 
between the underground and de Gaulle's headquarters-­
. problems with the Communists persisted, and not all of the 
non-Communist Resistance was Gaullist--the Resistance remain­
ed tied to his committee after the spring of 1943. 25 
Although able to attain substantial unity within it­
self, the effectiveness of the Resistance in bringing France 
together during the Occupation is more difficult to measure. 
Opinion ranges from the comment of Duroselle that "the 
occupation was not a unifying force" to Henri Michel's belief 
25Robert Aron, France Reborn The Histor of the Liber­
ation, trans. by Humphrey Hare New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1964), pp. 70-71; Henri Michel, Histoire de la 
ri'sistance (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958),
.PP. 41-52; Werth, France, 1940-1955, pp. 151-55, 164-69; 

Wright, France in Modern Times, pp. 521-23; A. W. DePorte, 

De Gaulle's Forei n Policy 1944-46 (Cambridge: . Harvard 





that consolidation of the Resistance "spared France from a 
~ivil war in the liberation period.,,26 Duroselle sees dis­
cord reflected in all the negative aspects of German occupa­
tion: . the suffering, the political divisions, humiliation 
in defeat, the loss of freedom~ But it is possible to argue 
that the misery in this period also led to the reestablish­
ment of a sense of community that had all but dissipated by 
the end of the Third Republic. Marc Bloch wrote after the 
defeat, "We find ourselves to-day in this appaling situation-­
that the fate of France no longer depends upon the French.,,27 
It is significant that his statement comes in the midst of a 
critique on the way France handled herself when fate ~ in 
the hands of the French. There would be enough time during 
the Occupation for many Frenchmen to deliberate, as Bloch did, 
the meaning of French defeat and the direction France should 
take once liberty was regained. Stanley Hoffmann contends 
that the common suffering o~ the war years brought about 
, 
Ita kind of rediscovery of France" by the French that were 
able to break through the confines of the stalem~te society, 
not in the political structure where the Fourth Republic 
returned to the system of the Third, but in the economic and 
social spheres where "a greater awareness of the nationwide 
26Duroselle, "Changes in French Foreign Policy Since 
1945," p. 326; Michel, Histoire de 1& r6sistance, p. 126. 
27Bloch, Strange Defeat, p. 174. 
16 
scope 	of economic problems" resulted from the programs of 

. . t t 28
the ma1n reS1S ance movemen s. . 
The military value of the wartime resistance--which was 
not great in affecting the outcome of the war--is less im­
portant than the contribution it made toward signs of a 
renewed France. "There are powerful arguments for the easier 
road of attentisme," Gordon Wright points out. "Still, a 
France totally committed to attentisme in those critical 
years 	might have left a heritage quite different from that 
derived from the resistance mystique.,,29 That French unity 
was so easily restored around de Gaulle's government is one 
of the probable differences brought about by consolidated 
underground support. "The recognition, sometimes implicit, 
sometimes overt, of General de Gaulle as head of the govern­
ment was the determining condition for the prevention of 
30~disaster during those difficult days of August 1944." 
A review of American relations with France during the 
war years does not reveal a pol1cy that contributed to French 
consonance. On the contrary, it suggests that the United 
States either failed to understand French needs and interests 
or. chose to give them little consideration.~1 
28Hoffmann, "Paradoxes of the French Political 

Community," pp. 39, 41. 

29Yright, France in Modern Times, p. 526. 

30Aron, France Reborn, p. 210. 

31 For variation in points of view, see Arthur Funk, 

who argues that President Roosevelt did not have designs on 

11 
It is undoubtedly true that the defeat in 1940 caused 
the United States to lose faith in France. Harry Hopkins 
said to de Gaulle in January 1945: 
The cause (of the unfortunate state of Franco­
American relations) • • • is above all the stupefy­
ing disappointment we suffered when we saw France 
collapse and surrender in the disaster of 1940. 
Our traditional conception of her value and her 
energy was overthrown in an instant. • . . Do not 
seek elsewhere for the true source of the attitude 
we have adopted toward your country.32 
All the same, if one does look elsewhere there is an 
odd incongruity to 
~ 
be seen in the position that President 
Roosevelt took toward France. On the one hand, it does not 
appear that he had any worked-out political plans for France, 
or that he was particularly concerned about what France's 
position would be in the postwar world. Reflecting on his 
conversation with Roosevelt in the summer of 1944, de Gaulle 
commented: 
France, that his attitude toward France was not punitive 
(although Funk contradicts himself in this on 'pp. 198-99) 
and that there is no evidence that he. wanted to keep France 
weak after the war, Charles de Gaulle: The Crucial Years. 
1943-44 {Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959}, pp. 
81, 300; Gaddis Smith, who insists that his desire to punish 
France for defeat is one of the keys to understanding 
Roosevelt's policy toward France, American Diplomacy During 
the Second World War. 1941-1945 {New York: John Wiley and 
Sons, Inc., 1961}, pp. 12, 15-16; Gabriel Kolko, who says 
that "In reality it was a question of whether France should 
be weak or strong after the war ••• ", The Politics of War: 
The World and United States Forei n Policy. 1943-1945 (New 
York: Random House, 1968 , p. 64, passim, chap_ iv. 
32The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle: Salvation, 
1944-1946, trans. by Richard Howard, III (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1960), 92. 
18 
The American President's remarks ultimately proved 
to me that, in foreign affairs, logic and sentiment 
do not weigh heavily in comparison with the reali­
'ties of power; that what matters is what one takes 
and what one can hold on to; that ~~ regain her place, 
France must count only on herself. 
To the 'extent that Roosevelt did come to recognize the value 
of rebuilding France, he did not want to make it an American 
, 
responsibility. That job he wanted Britain to handle. A 

clear example may be seen in a statement of the President's 

views, February 26, 1944: 

In as much as the United States is approximately 
3500 miles removed from Europe, it is not its 
natural task to bear the postwar burden of re­
constituting France. '34' This is properly the 
task of Great Britain. 
On the other hand, by his obstinate insistence on 

commanding policy regarding de Gaulle and 'the Free French 

forces, it would seem that Roosevelt chose a major role for 

himself in directing French des~iny through the end of the 

-'Yar and the liberation. 'He continually refused, to recognize 
de Gaulle's committee and remained inflexibl~ in this 
position, despite repeated British urging that recognition 
be granted, despite the unification of the National 
Resistance Council under de Gaulle, which the United States 
33The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle: Unit 1942­
1944, trans. b~ Richard Howard, II New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1959), p. 27. 
34Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, Diplomatic Papers, 1944, I (Washington, United States 
Government Printing Office, 1965), 184. 
19 
was made aware of but never recognized and never negotiated 
with as a collective body,35 and despite the fact that by 
January 1944 both the State and War Departments had agreed 
to the necessity of recognition. 36 
After January 1944, Roosevelt's position became par­
ticularly indefensible. It was no longer in the interest of 
the United States because it had become detrimental to the 
war effort. Eisenhower and Stimson had argued this in 
January and Stimson again tried to convince the President 
in June. 37 Neither was his policy in the interest of France. 
Roosevelt's own advisors were telling him that. "Who was 
misinforming the President?'1 asks H~rbert Feis. "Not the· 
military men in France. They were reporting that the average 
Frenchman looked to de Gaulle 'as the natural and inevitable 
leader of/the Free French. ,»38 But all arguments were to no 
avail. Roosevelt refused even de facto recognition until 
July 1944 (more than a month after the OVERLORD invasion) and 
de jure recognition until October. This resistance to any 
recognition had become a personal policy of the President 
which he insisted on pursuing against all exhortation. 
35Funk , Charles d~ Gaulle, p. 105. 
36Ibid ., p. 217-19, 295; Herbert Feis, Churchill, 
Roosevelt Stalin The war The Va ed and the Peace The 
Sought Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967 , p. 318. 
37Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Ser­
vice in Peace and War (New York: Harper, 1948), p. 551. 
38Feis , Roosevelt, Churchill, Stali~, p. 321. 
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By October 1944, there can be little doubt that he stood 
alone, among the leaders of the world, and among his advisors 
at home and in France, in his unwillingness to grant recog­
nition to the French Provisional Government under de Gaulle.39 
Whatever the reason for his attitude--and a dozen fears 
and doubts about de Gaulle and about France have been cited 
by various authors--it is certain that Roosevelt did not help 
the cause of French unification in its most critical hour, 
unless he did so in a negative way by uniting Frenchmen in 
common indignation at the diplomacy emanating from Washington. 
The endless American procrastination became an almost 
universal French grievance in the autumn of 1944. By Septem­
ber, a growing number of Roosevelt's advisors were warning 
. him of a possible revolution from the Left if he persisted 
in his policy.40 In January 1945, three months after recog­
nition had been given, complaints on this issue still showed 
, 0 f b 'do . 41 and 't 1S t unreasonabl t 0 t0no s1gn su S1 1ng, 1 no e sugges 
that one of the deepest roots of our postwar difficulties 
with France can be found in Roosevelt's dubious French policy 
42
ot 1944.
39Foreign Relations, 1944, III, 131-48. 

40Kolko, The Politics of War, p. 93. 

41Poreign Relations, 1945, IV, 661. 

42That is Crane Brinton's argument in The Americans and 

the French (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 
18-19. 
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A peaceful transition from Vichy to the new Republic 

depended upon the extent to which the French would trust 

"de Gaulle--after all, no other leader had the eminence or 
support necessary to ensure a quick restoration of unity. 
If their faith in him was unmoved by American diplomacy, it 
is certain that faith in their American ally was shaken. 
The French defeat in 1940 was a watershed moment in the 
history of Europe; its significance went far b~yond France: 
••• (I)t was the fall of France. that shocked many 
western Europeans into the first dim realization 
that the Europe they had known had little chance of 
surviving Hitler's war••••.(E)ven those . 
Westerners who refused to capitulate were shaken 
into a new awareness. Charles de Gaulle in 1940 
described the war as "~~e greatest revolution the 
world has ever known. tf .. 
But even de Gaulle, who recognized the world's "greatest 
revolution," was unable to accept its full meaning for 
Prance. Only gradually would leaders of the Fourth Republic 
discover the new and painful realities of the postwar world: 
. 
that there were only two great powers and France was not one 
of them,44 that the outcome of this war had brought an end to 
the epoch of European world dominance. 
Although the unanimity of Gaullist support broke down 
soon after liberation, it foundered on domestic issues, 
especially on the suspicion of ulterior motives behind the 
43Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945 

(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1968), p. 234. 

44Duroselle, "Changes in French Foreign Policy Since 

1945," p. 340. 
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strong-executive form of government that he was anxious to 
,
install. Leon Blum's comment on the feeling about de Gaulle 
" 
was that he "stood for democracy but did not embody it.,,45 
In international diplomacy, however, his views were generally 
accepted. Two of the most distinguished commentators on 
French affairs, M}1. Alfred Grosser and Raymond Aron, have 
both pointed out that while de Gaulle's inclination to put 
foreign affairs above everything else disappeared with his 
resignation from office in 1946, his conception of France's 
role in the world was not abandoned. 46 
The role that de Gaulle chose for France was based on 
the traditional idea of French grandeur. From 1944 to 1946, 
his primary goal was to re-establish French rank and pres­
tige, to return France to the status of a great power. How 
was this to be accomplished? 
I intended to assure France primacy in Western 
Europe by preventing the rise of a new Reich that 
might again threaten its safety; to co-operate with 
East and West and, if need be, contract the neces­
sary alliances on one side or the other without ever 
accepting any kind of dependency; to transform the 
French Union into a free association in order to 
avoid the as yet unspecified dangers of upheaval; 
to persuade the states along the Rhine, the Alps, 
and the Pyrenees to form a political, economic, 
45Quoted in Wright,France in Modern Times, p. 533. 
See also Thomson, Democracy in France Since 1870, p. 238. 
46Alfred Grosser, La 
politigue ext&rieur (Par=i~s~:~~A~.~C~0~1~i~n~,~1~9~6~1~,~p~p~.~3~3~-35; 
Raymond Aron, France Steadfast Fourth to 
the Fifth Republic Cambridge: Harvard Press, 
1960), p. 148. 
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and strategic bloc, to establish this organization 
as one of the three world povers and, should it 
become necessary, as the arbiter between the Soviet 
and Anglo-American camps.47 
That his policy of greatness might no longer be a role 
commensurate with France's means was not one of de Gaulle's 
consideratioris. His understanding of the French and 
European situation after the war was limited by his pre­
occupation with reviving the traditional stalldards of French 
grandeur. Wanting to avoid a return to the old political 
France of the thirties, "so malleable and so convenient for 
its allies,,,48 he did not turn to a program of adaptation, 
but to one rather which returned France to an even earlier 
era "of French policy in the great epochs before 1914 and in 
1919. . . . This was Foch's plan, taken up by Clemenceau in 
1919, with improvements.,,49 De Gaulle-s view of the world 
in this first phase was based upon "past realities and 
present expectations," rather than upon "present realities 
and future expectations. u50 Thus, the foremost threat to 
security was still understood in terms of renewed German 
aggression; the possibility'of France once again establish­
ing herself as a great power did not seem pretentious, 
47The Wa~ Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, III, 204-05. 
48~., p. 205. 
49Duroselle, "Changes in French Foreign Policy Since 
1945,1t p. 335. 
50Simon Serfaty, France, De Gaulle. and Europe: The 
Polic of the Fourth and Fifth Re ublics toward the Continent 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968 , p. xii. 
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despite her severely deterioriated condition; and, as for the 
colonial empire, de Gaulle remained impervious to the mid-
century movement towards decolonization. 
At home, the new spirit of renovation that had devel­
oped out of Vichy and the Resistance, placing economic and 
social reform above political aspirations, was foreign to 
de Gaulle. Yet it was here that the new sense of community 
was located. Here also could be found the quest for power, 
rank and prestige 51 _-goals held in common with de Gaulle's-­
but he did not recognize its significance or its value. 
Whereas the new mentality looked t~ expansion through a state­
directed economy and an integrated European economy, de Gaulle 
could visualize the revival of grandeur only in terms of 
French ~olitical leadership.52 He was not interested in 
economic matters, and his least imaginative decisions were 
53made in this area. Throughout most of the Fourth Republic, 
political leaders followed de Gaulle's example of focusing 
almost entirely on political concerns. Remarkable economic 
recovery was achieved between 1946 and 1958, but much of it 
51Hoffmann, "Paradoxes of the French Political 
Community," p. 53. 
52Ibig,., pp. 53-54, 56,. ·75; Duroselle, "Changes in 
French Foreign Policy Since 1945," pp. 337, 344; Thomson, 
Democracy in France Since 1870, pp. 233-35. 
53DePorte, De Gaulle's Foreign Policy, p. 283; Wright, 
France in Modern Times, p. 532. 
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happened "regardless of the regime, or even in spite of 
it. n54 Only in the last years of the Republic, Alfred 
Grosser has said, did economic modernization "burst the tra- . 
ditional modes of thought and action," and shift inspiration 
for political thought from tradition to acceptance of "the 
constant transformation of the world in general and France 
in particular."55 
On the question of France's role in the postwar world, 
it can be seen, then, that while there was disagreement be­
tween Frenchmen as to the means--political or economic 
primacy--the end coincided: France had to regain her status. 
This was de Gaulle's central concern in 1945, and under the 
new Republic it became a national aspiration. 
The primary collision of interests over the role that 
France would play came not from within France but from the 
world outside, and in particular from the United States. 
Anti-American sentiment ran the full length of the Fourth 
Republic and it revolved around France's repeated frustration 
in attempting to effect her goal. It is difficult to dispute 
the outcome of the political" contest when one considers that, 
during the course of the regime, "the entire Gaullist policy 
of 1944-1946 failed ••• "56 To Duroselle, this fact 
54Thomson, Democracy in France Since 1870, p. 255. 
55Quoted by Duroselle, "Changes in French Foreign 
~olicy Since 1945," p. 344. 
56Duroselle, "Changes in French Foreign Policy Since 
1"945," p. 337. 
indicates that the French policy of "return to normalcy" was 
unrealistic in a world so radically changed. 57 To "many 
leaders of the Fourth Republic, however, it rio doubt indi­
cated a new adversary. 
Understanding the development of Franco-American 
relations after the war demands an aware"ness of the psycho­
logical climate of the "two countries. Humiliation is a 
word frequently used to describe the French reaction to the 
war experience and the frame of mind that characterized the 
period of 1944-1958. Duroselle emphasises the humiliation 
suffered first in defeat and later endured by France's 
"slight share in the common victory"; Crane Brinton points 
to humiliation as the pervasive response to Roosevelt's 
policy of non-recognition; Hoffmann describes the renewed 
French drive to regain her internation~l prestige and power 
as a "battle against humiliation"; Grosser claims that the 
Fourth Republic made a "nationalism of humiliation. II58 At 
a conference sponsored by the World Peace Foundation in 
1956, a group of French delegates reported: 
The future of Franco-American relations depends in 
large measure on the disappearance of the inferiority 
complex :trom which the French have suffered during 
57Ibid ., pp. 335-37. 
58Ibid ., pp. 318-19, 325, 328, 330-32; Brinton, The 
Americans and the French, passim, chap. iv; Hoffmann, 
"Paradoxes of the French Political Community," p. 75; Alfred 
'Grosser, "Commodit6s de l'Anti-Americanisme,1I Le Monde, 
November 25, 1958, quoted in Serfaty, France, De Gaulle. and 
Europe, p. 121. 
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the past fifteen years. • •• (T)he French all too 
often feel themselves to be somehow diminished, and 
they often acquire in consequence the5~entality of 
an isolated and misunderstood person. 
The essential difference in French and American atti­
tudes in this period was "the dissatisfaction of the French 
and the satisfaction of the Americans when they think of the 
fate of their respective countries. n60 . Consciousness of 
failure was as real to the French as was American conscious­
61 
ness of success. The two were often directly related. 
From the first years after the war to the rejection 
of the Economic Defense Community Treaty (EDC) in August 
195~, some of the most divisive isiues of the western alli­
ance were raised by divergencies in policy regarding Germany. 
The western powers had hoped, before 1947, to avoid the 
division of Germany, but increasing concern that Germany 
might move toward the Communist camp led them to encourage 
economic and political reconstruction in the western zones. 
American decision makers also warmed to the idea of German 
integration into the West, and policy aimed in this direc~ 
tion was begun when the Marshall Plan connected economic aid 
with European unity. 
59guoted by Raymond Aron in Raymond Aron and August 
Beckscher, Diversit of Worlds: France and the United States 
Look at Their Common Problems New York: Reynal & Company, 
1957), p. 14. 
60Raymond Aron, Diversity of Worlds, p. 11. 
61 Ibid ., p. 13. 
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De Gaulle's objectives of dismemberment and strict 
control of Germany characterized the unambiguous French 
policy until 1947. This policy was brought to an end simply' 
by allied refusal to accept it, and, from 1947 to 1950, 
France shifted with some reluctance to the western view of 
cooperation. Most of her efforts now went towards dragging 
out the process of German rebuilding. But in 1950, her 
position again shifted whe~ she proposed the European Coal 
and Steel Community, for the first time initiating a move­
ment toward European integration that would satisfy American 
interests and her own. 
From the beginning of postwar policy there had been 
a small but active group of Frenchmen, stemming mainly from 
the Resistance, who favored a policy of cooperation with 
Germany, and after 1947 the idea of a European economic 
62 . . .
community gained in popularity. German rearmament was 
quite another question however. If to Americans it merely 
signi~ied the next logical step in the build up of Germany, 
it required for Frenchmen na complete and sudden reversal 
of their German policy.n63 Robert Schuman, the French 
62This acceptance should not be exaggerated. Duroselle 
writes that "as late as 1953 and 1954 during the EDC debates, 
the fear of German will to dominate and the fear of being 
submerged by Germany's superior economic power were still 
very much alive," "Changes in French Foreign Policy Since 
1945," p. 348. 
63Alfred Grosser, France Defeats EDG, ed. by Daniel 
Lerner and Raymond Aron (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 
Inc., 1957), p. 57. 
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Minister of Foreign Affairs, had declared on July 25, 1949: 
nGer~any does not have a peace treaty. She has no army and 
should not have any. She has no armaments and will not have 
64
any." But in September 1950, at the American request for 
,. ,.
German rearmament, Rene Pleven, Schuman and Moch were forced 
to advance some proposal for Germany's participation in the 
defense of Europe. By structuring the issue of remilitari­
zation in the framework of the European idea, a method that 
had worked successfu~ly with the Schuman Plan, it was hoped 
that hostile members of the French government and Parliament 
would be appeased, and that, at the same time, a positive 
alternative might be given to the American suggestion of 
German rearmament through NATO. 
There followed a great debate which preoccupied west­
ern diplomacy for the next three years. It was a debate 
carried on "in the true French style, passionate, theoreti­
cal, and cOD.fused. ,,65 Confusion came primarily from the 
fact that the 
EDC combined two qui~e different ideas, only acci­
dentally related: that of the rearmament of the 
Federal Republic and that of a supranational 66 
authority in the six-nation European community. 
France's principal interest was in European unity while the 
64guoted in ~., p. 56. 

65Raymond Aron, France, Steadfast and Changing, p. 151. 

66Raymond Aron, Diversity of Worlds, p. 36. 

30 
United States wanted to see Germany rearmed. But even 
within France, these two distinct ideas created multiple 
divisions. 
Not only did the EDC's intended purpose become muddled, 
but its alternative was lost sight of as well. A substan­
tial number of deputies in the National Assembly errored in 
defining the choice availa~l~ to them, and voted as if the 
question was one of German rearmament or no German rearma­
ment when French freedon really amounted to c'hoosing between 
a French-sponsored program and the American proposal of 
remilitarization through NATO. Much of this confusion was 
without doubt the fault of American policymakers who, by 
1954, fully supported the EDC and tried to apply pressure to 
obtain its ratification at a time when they should have 
practiced restraint. Raymond Aron states that, as to the 
inappropriateness of American tactics, "there was no lack 
~f warning by Frenchmen completely devoted to the Atlantic 
Alliance. n67 The French mood was one of "a generally 
negative nationalism which, to assert its independence, 
rejected all projects proposed by others.,,68 In this 
atmosphere, Mr. Dulles' clumsy declaration that an "agoniz­
ing reappraisal" would be connected with the defeat of the 
EDC only increased the desire of many Frenchmen to see it 
defeated. But their miscalculation soon became evident when, 
67Ibid ., pp. 38-39. 

68Andr: Philip, France Defeats EDe, p. 26. 
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four months later, these same men went through the humili­
ating experience of confirming the earlier American pro­
posal. 

The lesson of German rearmament for Franco~American 
relations was not learned very well by either country 
although it was repeated many times during the years of the 
. Fourth Republic, over the Atlantic Alliance, the Suez affair 
and the decolonization of the French empire. 
On the American side, it revealed an insensitivity to 
the French situation. 
• • • France was the only nation in which the great 
international problems of the period--the cold war, 
decolonization--became the dominant demestic issueg, 
the main sources of party conflicts and divisions. 
This intermingling of France's foreign and domestic problems 
was not sufficiently understood by the United States, despite 
the evidence of the EDC debate. 70 Had Washington given more 
attention to French developments and adopted a more subtle 
policy on the EDC, its own interest--which was to see the 
EDC ratified--might have been realized, and certainly much 
of the ensuing anti-Americanism could have been averted. 
69Hoffm~nn, "Paradoxes of the French Political 
. ICommunity," p. 74. See also Charles Moraze, The French and 
the Republic, trans. by J.-J. Demorest (Ithaca, New York; 
Cornell University Press, 1958). 
70 .
Edgar Furniss, France Troubled All: De Gaulle's 
Heritage and Prospects New York: Published for the Council 
9n Foreign Relations by Harper & Brothers, 1960), p. 300. 
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Neither was the anti-American sentiment, attached to 
the rejection of the EDC, a special case. Yhat gave occasion 
to anti-Americanism under the Fourth Republic? "From one 
end to "the other," Alfred Grosser has commented, 
from 1947-49 until 1958, the element of anti­
Americanism, springing from a feeling of dependence, 
seems undeniable to me. This anti-Americanism grew 
stronger with the impression of greater dependence 
on "the United States. 71 
This "feeling of dependence" was rife by the end of the EDC 
debate, and much of it had been brought on unnecessarily by 
heavy-handed American diplomacy. Throughout Franco-American 
relations in the postwar period, a greater perception of 
French problems, a more tactful approach on the part of the 
United States when following its interests, would no doubt 
have avoided numerous strains placed on the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
For France, the lesson of German rearmament was that 
her freedom to pursue traditio~a1 goals was limited by her 
weakness. This lesson was reaffirmed during the Suez crisis: 
Britain and France, the third and fourth world powers, were 
abruptly stopped and their interests overridden when they 
contradicted Soviet and American aims. 72 And it was repeated 
throughout the long process of deco10nization. But the 
71A1fred Grosser, French Foreign Policy Under 
De Gaulle, trans. by Lois Ames Pattison, with a Foreword b~ 
Stanley Hoffmann (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), 
p. 7. 
72Durose11e, "Changes in French Foreign Policy Since 
1945," pp. 340-41. 
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everpresent French desire for independence was not to be so 
quickly pressed into submission. In fact, h~miliation and 
insecurity decreased after 1954 as French economy recovered. 
French businessmen learned that they were not inherently 
inferior in a competitive market, and economic ties with 
Germany continued to strengthen as the advantages of collab­
oration became evident. To the distress of American policy­
makers, the drive toward independence became even more 
exacerbated after de Gaulle's return in 1958 than it had 
been under the Fourth Republic. 
CHAPTER III 
THE GOOD OFFICES MISSION OF 1958 
By 1958, France's central concern was no longer 
Germany--it was Algeria. In the case of Germany the United 
States had tried to coerce France into submitting to American 
interests, against even the advice of American sympathizers 
in France, thereby creating a good deal of hard feeling for 
no reason. In the case of French colonialism, and the 
Algerian war in particular, the United States played a 
different kin~ of role. Here it pretended that it had no 
interests. Here it went out of its way not to interfere 
with French policy. But in the end the result was the same. 
The culmination of this policy--the seemingly innocuous 
(even impotent) good offices mission in the early part of 
1958--was to create a new and virulent wave of anti­
Americanism. A description and analysis of that mission 
will be the concern of this chapter while the next chapter 
will discuss Franco-American discord and the postwar foreign 
policies of France and the United States, both more generally 
and in greater depth, in an attempt to discover how it is 
that America could not seem to do right. 
The war in Indochina lasted from December 1946 until 
July 1954, a span of nearly eight years. It ended with 
35 
French withdrawal. Soon afterwards,in November 1954, the 
Algerian war began, led by what later became the National 
Liberation Front, and this war outlived the Fourth Republic. 
ttHistorica~ly," writes Raymond Aron, "the twelve years of the 
Fourth Republic seem to have been dominated by these two 
conflicts, which may be called colonial but whose magnitude 
made them national."1 
Algeria, even more than Indochina, inspired passionate 
reactions in France. However fictitious might the thinking 
have been which insisted "Algeria is France," this was the 
view taught in French schools and, even in 1958, an "over­
whelming majority" of Frenchmen thought of Algeria as an 
2integral part of France. The one million French citizens 
living in Algeria reinforced this idea and made arguments 
for Algerian independence more difficult. By the mid­
fifties, Algeria had also taken on symbolic value. The 
regime which made a "nationalism of humiliation ll saw, in 
Algeria, the last stronghold of French empire. Many politi­
cians in France, particularly those on the Right, convinced 
themselves that the loss of Algeria would mean irreparable 
damage to France economi~ally and politically. Limited to 
lRaymond Aron, France, Steadfast and Changing, p. 78. 
2Dorothy Pickles, Algeria and France: From Colonialism 
to Cooperation (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 18; 
G. Barraclough, Survey of International Affairs: 1956-1958, 
issued under the auspices of the Koyal Institute of Inter­
national Affairs (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 
p. 280. 
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her hexagon, France would be forever reduced to insignifi­
cance. For the French army, whose pride had suffered most 
from the constant backsliding in Indochina, at Suez, Moracco 
and Tunisia, Algeria was also seen as the last line of 
resistance. Would military leaders be willing to challenge 
the Republic, if need be, to guarantee their position in 
Algeria? By 1958, military support in the political decisions 
of the Republic was no longer certain. French leaders-­
, .
including the head of government, Fel~x Gaillard--were uncom­
fortablyaware of the army's intransigence.) 
Beyond the divisions created in the search for an 
Algerian solution, on one point all Frenchmen agreed: 
Algeria was an internal French problem; a settlement formula, 
if one was to be forthcoming, demanded the absence of outside 
interference. This insistence on a French solution became, 
it would seem, a jealously guarded point of national honor. 
It became as well an increasingly difficult position to 
maintain. How long could a. confrontation with the United 
States be avoided while France jeopardized NATO security by 
diverting most of her divisions to Algeria, or challenged 
the future of a European economic community with her war'­
time economic measures, or continued what could only be 
interpreted in 'Washington as colonialism at a time when the 
United States was vying for the friendship of newly 
)Alexander 'Werth, The De Gaulle Revolution (London: 
Robert Hale Limited, 1960), p. 21. 
37 
independent nations? Pressure on France grew throughout 
1957 as no solution appeare~. Most of the pressure was 
self-generated. Washington, for the most part, went out of 
its way to avoid straining the NATO alliance. But France 
understood American interests, and watched with growing 
suspicion for any sign that their rights in Algeria might 
be challenged. And if some sign appeared--e.g. the ship­
ment of arms to Tunisia in November 1957--French politicians 
virtually overwhelmed themselves with hand-wringing and 
outburs t s 0f 1n 19na 10n.· d' t' 4 
Hostilities grew, the army's·towards the Republic 
which, it suspected, would soon "sellout" in Algeria as it 
always had before,the Left's towards the Right for not 
giving up in Algeria, the ~ight's towards the Left for 
endangering chances of an Algerian "victory" by its unpatri­
otic attitude, and everyone's in France towards any outsider 
who might appear anxious to precipitate an end to the war. 
The bombardment of the small Tunisian border village, 
Sakiet Sidi Youssef, by French forces in Algeria "once again 
turned the Algerian war into a question of discord within 
the North Atlantic alliance,"5 and finally gave some sub­
stance to the long-nurtured fears of American involvement in 
4"French Pride and Prejudice," The Economist (London), 
November 23, 1957, pp. 690, 692. 
5Barraclough, Survey of International -Affairs: 1956­
1958, p. 509. 
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North Africa and "internationalizati6n" of the Algerian 
conflict. The good offices mission, set up to conciliate 
the Franco-Tunisian rift, brought the United States and 
Great Britain into the North African problem to a limited 
degree. Defining that limit became one of the key issues 
in France's reaction to the mission. 
Until now, the discussion of France and the United 
States has been general, reviewing in particular events 
and attitudes that shaped France's view of the world from 
1944 to 1958. In this chapter, a more specific look at 
French-American relations will be taken through a consid­
eration of the AnglO-American good offices mission to }'rarice 
and Tunisia in 1958. This particular mission concluded 
major diplomatic intercourse between the two countries 
under the Fourth Uepublic, and once again indicates some 
of the broader difficulties that persisted throughout the 
period. 
On 'the morning of February 8, 1958, twenty-five French 
-military planes strafed and bombed Sakiet Sidi Youssef in 
successive waves of attack for one hour and twenty minutes. 
It was a market day and many people had gathered in the vil­
lage. According to the official Tunisian count, seventy­
nine persons were killed, among them eleven women and twenty 
children; 130 persons were wounded. Most of the village 
was destroyed, including homes, the school, and several 
., 
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International Red Cross trucks that had been scheduled to 
deliver relief supplies. 
For France and Tunisia, the event marked the culmina­
tion of more than a year of uneasy relations. France was 
demanding strict Tunisian and Moroccan neutrality in the 
Algerian war as the price for continued friendship, but 
Tunisia continued to support the insurgents, to ~arbor rebels 
on her own territory and to provide them with supplies. This 
moral and material aid kept her positi~n with France under 
constant strain. Relations had already reached a boiling 
point on January 11 when a French detachment was ambushed 
by rebel forces in Algeria near Sakiet and prisoners were 
reported to have been taken back into Tunisia by their 
6
captors., When the Tunisian President, Habib Bourguiba, 
disputed this claim, refusing first to accept a French note 
of protest and then to receive special representatives sent 
by Gaillard, Ambassador Georges Gorse was recalled from 
Tunis and negotiations for much-needed French economic aid 
were droppcd. 
Tunisia depended on France economically, but Tunisian 
sympathies were decidedly with the Algerian rebels. This 
was Bourguiba's dilemma; it restricted his flexibility in 
dealing with France. He could not compromise his support 
of the F. L. N. without damaging, perhaps irremediably, his 
6The New York Times, February 9, 1958, p. 3. 
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own popularity as the Tunisian leader. Bourguiba was hoping, 
nevertheless, to reopen discussions with France when, two 
days before the Sakiet incident, he suggested that Ambassador 
. 7Gorse re t urn t 0 Tun1S. 
The bom,bing of Sakiet, for the first time in three 
years of fighting, focused worldwide attention on the trou­
bles in North Africa, and sympathy was not on the side of 
France. The brutality of the attack shocked governmental 
leaders around the world while, in Paris, officials were 
stunned by the unrestrained and almost universal condemnation 
of the raid. 8 Le Monde predicted the worst kind of result 
from the bombardment for France: that internationalization 
of the Algerian conflict was now certain. 9 
Habib Bourguiba saw the same possibility and bent his 
efforts toward turning Le Monde's prediction into reality. 
Within a week of the incident, he had submitted a formal 
request for a meeting of the United Nations Security Council, 
charging France with aggressive action at Sakiet. France 
filed a counter-complaint on February 14 in which Tunisia 
was accused of permitting the launching of rebel operations 
from her territory.10 Then, on the evening of February 16, 
7New York Times, February 8, 1958, p. 2. 
8 ~ew York Times, February 11, 1958, p. 2. 
9Le Monde, February 11, 1958, p. 1. 
10United Nations, Security Council, Thirteenth Year, 




Bourguiba instructed his Ambassador to the United Nations, 
Mongi Slim, by telephone to Frepare a new complaint to the 
effect that the Algerian war was threatening North African 
peace, thus widening his earlier complaint to include 
. 11Alger1.a. 
In France, N. Gaillard was caught in an emba.rrassing 
and difficult position. The order to bomb Sakiet had not 
been given in Paris. "Who commands in Algeria?" M. Pierre 
Cot asked in the National Assembly on February 11. "Civil 
authorities or military authorities? Then who has supreme 
. 12 
Command?" When Foreign Affairs Minister Christ.ian Pineau 
admitted several days later that neither he nor Gaillard nor 
Robert Lacoste, the Minister for Algeria, had been informed 
in advance of the plan to attack Sakiet, the government 
again came under attack. To former Premier Robert Schuman, 
the situation disclosed a shocking lack of government con­
. Al . 1 3 t ro I over the armed f orces 1.n ger1.a. 
What was Gaillard to do? The Left wing of his major­
ity, the Radicals, Socialists and Catholic Popular Repub­
licans, were greatly disturbed over Sakiet and demanded some 
. . 
dated 13 February 1958 from the Representative of Tunisia to 
the President of the Security Council, S/3952, and Letter 
dated 14 Februar 19 8 from the Re resentative of France to 
the President of the 3954, pp. 13-16. 
l1New York Times, February 17,1958, p. 1. 
~12Journal Officiel, D~bats Parlementaires, Assemblee 
Nationale, February 11, 1958, p. 663. 
13New York Times, February 15, 1958, p. 3. 
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form of appeasement. But the Right wing, Independents and 
Gaullists, stood in firm defense of the action. As Robert 
Doty described the dilemma, 
••• if M. Gaillard should choose to 'cover' sub­
ordinates responsible for the order, he would be in 
trouble with the Center and Left. If, on the other 
hand, he should decide to discipline those who 14 
launched the raid, the Right would react strongly. 
After presenting a fairly strong case against Bourguiba's 
belligerence, referring notably to his unwillingness to 
cooperate in the ~anuary incident near Sakiet, Gaillard 
"covered tl the bombing without reservation and got a vote of 
confidence from the National Assembly.15 "Afterwards it was 
whispered that, much as Gaillard hated doing it, he had no 
-choice: had he disavowed the Army the effect in Algeria 
might have been 'incalculable' • . . Even if he had a 
choice, Gaillard no doubt hoped, by his defense of the Army, 
to allay suspicions that the Fourth Republic was falling 
into chaos. 
The United States also found itself with strong inter­
ests in the Sakiet affair. Almost immediately, Secretary of 
State Dulles met with Herv~ Alphand, the French Ambassador 
in Washington, to express American concern over the bombing 
14Ibid ., February 11, 1958, p. 2. 
15Yotingresults: 335 to 179. Journal Officiel, D~bats 
Parlementaires, Assembl&e Nationale, February 11, 1958, p. 
696. 

16Werth, The De Gaulle Revolution, p. 21. 
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and to impress upon France the importance that the United 
States attached to the incident. Of the twenty-five aircraft 
employed in the raid, seventeen were American-built. The 
incident caught the United States between its alliance with 
France and the image of friendship it was trying to create 
among new African and Asian nations. "Reactions from the 
Arab capitols," the New York Times stated, "showed that the 
Arabs regarded United States handling of the bombing as a 
test of the value of United States professions of sympathy 
tor the nations that recently won iheir independence."17 
United States officials free~ expressed hope that 
Tunisia could be persuaded against bringing the issue before 
the Security Council. Sensitive to American concerns, the 
Tunisian President suggested an alternative on February 13 
of mediation by the United States. French leaders at first 
gave no indication that they were willing to modify their 
position, but by February 15, they had become receptive to 
some form of third-party conciliation. Meanwhile, anxious 
to head off a Security Council debate, the United States 
drafted a formal offer of its good offices in the dispute. 18 
It had probably hoped to extricate itself entirely from the 
dispute: on February 14, officials suggested the good offices 
17 .
New York Times, February 11, 1958, pp. 1, 4. 
18Ibid ., February 14, 1958, p. 1; February 15, 1958, p. 
3; February 16, 1958, p. 1; February 17, 1958, p. 3. 
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of Secretary General Dag Hamwarskjold, and Robert Murphy 
claims that the Government was "rather reluctant" to assume 
the task. 19 
The good offices mission was set up as a joint Anglo-
American undertaking, with Deputy Under Secretary of State 
Robert Murphy appointed as the American representative, and 
Harold Beeley of the Foreign Office representing the British. 
If the mission did not get underway in an atmosphere of high 
expectation, almost everyone breathed a temporary sigh of 
.relief at its acceptance. No party could take comfort at 
the thought of a Security Council debate. Neither France 
nor Tunisia had built a case strong enough to guarantee the 
outcome. The Tunisian record was marred by Bourguiba's 
inability or unwillingness to close the border to fellaga 
infiltration. France stood to lose most from an unfavorable 
decision in that the North African problem might become 
truely internationalized and taken out of French hands. And 
the United States, with interests on both sides, faced 
embarrassment whatever the result. 
But the escape route offered by good offices presented 
an illusory solution. True, it avoided the'direct confron­
tation that would inevitably have come from a meeting in the 
Security Council, but was this evasiveness altogether desir­
able? The good offices further confused an already 
19New York Times, February 15, 1958,.p. 3; Robert 
Murphy, Correspondence with the Author, see Appendix. 
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complicated situation by its indirect method and, at the 
same time, sacrificed the authority needed to resolve Franco-
Tunisian differences. 
The incompatible positions that France and Tunisia 
would have taken to the·United Nations now became bases for 
defining the role of good offices. Tunisia welcomed the 
mission believing that, through it, the same goals it had 
hoped to attain in the Security Council would still be 
realized: 
a Western commitment to an Algerian settlement; the" 
settlement itself, based on Algerian autonomy; th~ 
evacuation of French troops fro,ln Tunisia; an escape 
from the risks of extremist Moslem nationalism; and 
a resumption of relations, including economic ties, 
with Prance. 20 
Although he had received no assurance from the United States 
that pressure would be put on France to negotiate an Algerian 
peace, Bourguiba interpreted a statement by Dulles, suggest­
ing that the Algerian question could be removed from the 
strictly juridical status of an internal French problem, as 
a shift in the American position. 21 
Gaillard also recognized some advantages in accepting 
the AnglO-American mission. Support for his government came 
from a Parliamentary majority drawn from both the Left and 
the Right. Since his majority was divided on the Sakiet 
issue, the Left demanding appeasement and the Right insisting 
20 .Furn1ss, France, Troubled Ally, p. 226. 

21;N~e~w-=Y~0~r=k~T=i=m~e~s, February 19, 1958, p. 3. 

that no concessions be made, Gaillard could perhaps 
satisfy the demands of the Left by allowing the good 
offices mission to do its work. Subsequent attacks 
by the Right could then be diverted from the Premier 
himself to the United States and Britain, which were 
already suspected by conservatives of wishing to 
eliminate French influence from North Africa. 22 
Anxious, however,'to minimize outside interference as 
far as possible, France insisted on the interpretation of 
"good offices" provided by international law, which limits 
its function to something less than mediation. 23 "Mediation" 
allows for suggestions by a third party in a dispute, 
"arbitration" for a moral judgment, but "good offices" 
involves no more than relaying messages between disputants 
until direct communication can be re-established. 24 
Tunisian and French expectations of the good offices 
differed radically then; Bourguiba took the broadest possible 
interpretation and France the most narrow. American offi­
cials, perhaps bewildered by these contradictory positions, 
were less consistent in 'defining the mission's purpose. A 
mediating role dealing solely with the Tunisian affair, said 
State Department officials. But they also "saw significance 
in the fact that, with French consent, the United States was 
becoming officially involved for the first time in the 
22Furniss, France, Troubled Ally, p. 227. 

23Le Monde, February 25, 1958, pp. 1, 4. 






That Murphy was sent off to Europe without any clear 
assignment reinforced the tendency of the good offices to 
exacerbate confusion and distrust •. On the road to Paris, 
Murphy stopped in New York and London to discuss the situation 
with Dag Hammarskjold and Harold Beeley respectively. Arriv­
ing in Paris on February 24, he claimed only to be looking 
for "useful conversations."26 While this noncommittal posi­
tion accurately reflected Washington's anxiety to remain 
neutral, to the skeptical French opinion which met him, it 
suggested something more sinister-~that the mission's "real" 
intentions were being held carefully in reserve. And suspi­
cion increased over the next two months as Murphy traveled 
between Paris, Tunis and London. 
In the opening talks, Gaillard emphatically told 
Murphy that Algeria went beyond the purview of his mission; 
re-establishing conditions for bilateral talks between 
France and Tunisia must be its single objective. 27 The good 
officers agreed on this point~ Murphy claims in his book, 
Diplomat Among Warriors, that the war in Algeria "was the 
very last thing in which we wanted to become involved, and 
25New York Times, February 25, 1958, p. 4. 
26New York Times, February 24, 1958, p. 4. 
27Yerth, The De Gaulle Revolution, p. 23; New York 
Times, February 27, 1958, p. 4. 
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we carefully avoided any implication of it in our talks. 1I28 
But Bourguiba wanted to discuss the war when Murphy reached 
Tunis and, after his second meeting with Murphy, he stated 
that they ~ad talked about Algeria. 29 Meanwhile, the New 
York Times continued to speculate about a possible Algerian 
settlement. On March 1, the same day Murphy claimed Algeria 
was carefully being excluded from his talks in Tunis, the 
French press reported the New York Times to have said that 
"a.n American solution" was "being prepared" for the Algerian 
problem. 30 
In retrospect, such indirect references to Algeria per­
haps seem innocuous, but adament divisions in France at th~ 
time had created a mood not to be trifled with: 
Not since the settlement of accounts between the 
wartime resistance members and collaborators, have 
observers here been so oppressed by an atmosphere 
of hatred and suspicion in public life engendered 
by partisanship over the issue tif Algeria. 
On the Right. • •• (t)he suggestion is advanced, 
even in high Government circles, that withdrawal 
from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and 
from European unity would not be too high a price 
to pay to be left alone to "keep Algeria French." 
On the Left there is enough fear of renascent 
domestic fascism to produce the beginning of a will­
ingness to work with the-Communists, if necessary, 
to bring about a peaceful settlement in Algeria and 
end the supressions -of liberties here and in Algeria. 31 
28Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday, 1964), p. 396. 
29Verth, The De Gaulle Revolution, p. 23. 
30Quoted in ibid., p. 24. 
31New York Times, March 1, 1958, p. 4. 
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Neither side felt that things were going its way and each 
grew more insistent. Carrefour and Voici Pourguoi, the two 
Right-wing papers, concentrated their attacks on the good 
offices mission. In this climate, trlurphy returned to Paris 
to begin his second round of talks. 
M. Gaillard was having great difficulty by March 
convincing anybody of his government's authority. In an 
effort to appease his Right wing, he started a police action 
against the "defeatist press. n On March 5, the Interior 
Ministry seized three Leftist periodicals, L'Express, France-
Observateur and France Nouvelle, which contained articles 
protesting the Algerian war. In Le t-londe of March 7, M. 
Andr~ Ch~nebenoit reacted violenjly, objecting to circum­
stances in which the ~ight was apparently free to do what­
ever it wanted while the Government reserved its assaults 
tor the Left. This tolerence only encouraged the Right's 
Fascist and racialist tendencies. 32 
Ch~nebenoit's warning seemed justified when, a week 
later, over 1000 policemen gathered outside the National 
Assembly, shouting expression that were anti-Parliamentary 
and even anti-Semitic. Supposedly an economic demonstration, 
the gathering was quite obviously of a political nature, and 
Ch~nebenoit again blamed the Government: 
For months now, there seems to be an unwritten 

rule about political demonstrations: complete 

32Le Monde, March 7, 1958, p. 1. 
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indulgence towards the "super-patriots", and extreme 
toughness towards "defeatists". Kight-wing meetings 
are allowed. Left-wing meetings--cven the most mod­
erate Left-wing meetings--are prohibited. No one 
trying to overthrow the regime is treated as a Rebel 
anymore; only those are treated as Rebels who sho~3 
up· the weakness of the Government and the r6gime. 
The greatest weakness of the Government was that, con­
fronted with parliamentary division, it lacked the strength 
to provide a needed Algerian solution. Algers frightened 
Gaillard, and embroilment over North Africa was pushing the 
French Government towards the Right as Gaillard worked not 
only to retain !tight-wing support in France but to escape, 
. as well, a possible confrontation ~ith the Army in Algeria. 
But efforts to gratify the Right had their limit. 
Gaillard was not willing to go so far as to foster a breach 
with the United States, and he continued to work with the 
good offices mission. By March 10, Murphy had won French 
approval for a plan to regroup and withdraw French forces 
from Tunisia in excess of those needed to ~perate the Bizerta 
navel base. In exchange, Tunisia would have to deny free 
passage and supplies to Algerian rebels by accepting neutral 
surveillance of its frontier and of four southern air bases 
at Sfax, Gafsa, Gab~s and Kemade. 34 
Murphy carried his newly-won proposals to Tunis only 
to be met with stiff resistance by Tunisia's President. 
33Le Monde, March 15, 1958, p. 1. 

34New York Times, March 11, 1958, p. 10. 
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Bourguiba demanded a negotiated settlement of the Algerian 
insurrection and added that France would have to accept, in 
principle, the evacuation of Bizerta. He seemed to be losing 
patience w~th the good offices mission. The good officers 
were gi~en a week to choose between his and the French posi­
'tions. Insisting that the mission take a clear stand, he 
said: 
It is useless for the United states and British 
conciliators to come to Tunisia simply to acquaint 
us with Gaillard's thinking and then return to 35 
France with the ideas of the Tunisian Government. 
~ut that was precisely the nature of the good office's rol~ • 
. An odd occurrence followed. Tunisia radically modified 
its defiant position and a compromise with Murphy was reached 
within several days. How was this sudden shift to be inter­
preted? Had Bourguiba finally resigned himself to the 
limited function of the good offices? Perhaps the Tunisian 
Government realized at last that the most it could expect 
of the Anglo-American mission was a return to the situation 
before Sakiet. 36 
To the French Right, Bourguiba's sharp reversal appear­
ed explicable o.nly if Murphy had made a secret agreement with 
the Tunisian leader to press for an Algeria~ solution. 37 A 
violent campaign against the good offices began in Paris in 
35Quoted in New York Times, March 14, 1958, p. 6. 
36New York Times, March 17, 1958, p. 9. 
37New York Times, March 19, 1958, pp. 1 , 9. 
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anticipation of Murphy's return. Representing the Independ­
ent (moderate Right) position, Roger Duchet declared that 
"inadmissable concessions" demanded of France by Murphy 
would threaten a ministerial crisis. 38 
A compromise settlement was predicted in "well-informed 
quarters" as l-lurphy returned to Paris on March 17. 39 In 
reality, the good offices stood on the verge of collapse. 
Immediately in dispute~ when Murphy revealed the plan he had 
drawn up, was a proposal that France turn over to Tunisians 
the four airfields in the South during the course of evacuat­
ing her 22,000 troops from Tunisia. Independents and 
dissident Radicals threatened to withdraw support from the 
Government if this point were accepted by Gaillard. 40 
The larger issue, of course, was the Right's distrust 
of American motives. This situation did not improve after 
mid-March, and Gaillard's Government sank into immoblisme. 
On the one hand, Gaillard hoped to keep the good offices 
alive in order to avert further internationalization of the 
Algerian rebellion by bringing the Franco-Tunisian dispute 
before the United Nations. On the other hand, his shaky 
coalition government rested on Right-wing support which 
continued to resist the good offices mission out of conviction 
38New York Times, March 17, 1958, p. 3. 

39New York Times, March 18, 1958, p. 1. 

40New York Times, March 19, 1958, p. 1. 
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that its proposals favored Tunisia. Gaillard was presented 
with the unattractive alternative of an international or a 
domestic crisis. Not ready to choose immediately, he suc­
cessfully stalled a Tunisian decision until the end of the 
month when Parliament recessed for Easter. 
Before the Easter recess, Gaillard was driven by the 
Right to demand neutral control of both sides of the 
Tunisian-Algerian border as an indispensable condition for 
. d . t d' . . th T . 41reopenlng lrec lSCUSSlons Wl unlS. Murphy returned 
to London on March 10 for a five-day stay, and then carried 
the French demand to Tunis. In a conciliatory mood, 
Bourguiba agreed to a number of further concessions, but 
he would not accept border surveillance. This final position 
of the Tunisian Government was taken to France, and, because 
of its modifications, Murphy encouraged Gaillard to accept 
it. 
Having assured the Assembly that border, ~ontrol would 
be the inflexible requirement, Gaillard scheduled a Minister­
ial Council for Friday, April 11, to discuss the latest 
proposal. Another sensation, however, caused him to postpone 
the meeting until Saturday when he received appeals from the 
United States and Britain ~rging him to ~eep the Tunisian 
dispute out of the Security Council.' These messages were 
reinforced by a letter from Eisenhower requesting that the 
41Yerth, The De Gaulle Revolution, p. 30; New York 
Times, April 13, 1958, sec. 4, p. 2. 
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good offices be given another chance and asking the French 
Government not to force a choice on the United states be­
tween France and Tunisia. France, in other words, could 
count on ~he United States and Britain for no more than 
42
abstention in a Security Council vote.
The Gaillard Government was back in the situation of 
three weeks before, but its room for maneuver had narrowed. 
Pressure from the United States was stiffer and the Independ­
ent's opposition had correspondingly increased. Gaillard's 
dilemma remained the same: 
• (I)f he cedes to the primarily negative in­
transigence of the "moderates," (Independents) he 
can no longer count on the understanding and thus 
the support of our allies; if he completely takes 
into account the reasoning of the allies and ex­
cessivelymodifies the position of the French Gov­
ernment as hitherto defined, he risks being aban­
do~ed.by ~~e of the most important parties of his 
maJorl.ty. 
Saturday's Ministerial Council, a twelve-hour ordeal, 
did nothing to resolve the fundamental disagre~ment between 
the head of government, who had moved toward supp6rt of the 
good offices' proposals, and his five Right-wing ministers. 
By the end of the day, an unscheduled session of Parliament 
had been called for Tuesday, April 15, to settle the dispute. 
Murphy's proposals would provide a "basis of discussion" 
42"A Letter From Ike," Time, April 21, 1958, p. 19; 
New York Times, April 12, 1958, p. 1. 
43Le Monde, April 14, 1958, pp. 1, 3. 
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with the right reserved to submit the frontier control issue 
to the Security Council. 44 
The "moderates" believed that Gaillard was giving in 
to American pressure, and that they had been compensated in 
the frontier question after conceding the matter of air 
fields. 45 Time magazine thanked Eisenhower for winning the 
Anglo-American mission a reprieve. This judgment was clearly 
mistaken. The letter only increased parliamentarians' hostil­
ity. True, Gaillard was probably encouraged by Eisenhower's 
letter to back the mission, but, to that extent, it insured 
fiis fall. 
At the core of rightist irritation rested the fact 
that the mission had moved beyond the proper function of 
good offices, and in the direction anticipated. On Sunday, 
Jacque Soustelle, the former Governor General of Algeria 
who would lead the Assembly fight against Murphy's proposals, 
declared bitterly: "As was expected, the pretended good 
offices has transformed itself into a partial mediation 
hostile to the vital interests of France.,,46 The Right was 
furious with Gaillard for his willingness to accept the 
"suicidal" recommendations which were as follows: 
EVACUATION: All French troops stationed outside 
the Bizerta perimeter are to be evacuated in 
44Yerth, The De Gaulle }Gevolution, p. 31. 

45Le Monde, April 15, 1958, p. 1. 

46Quoted in New York Times, April 14, 1958, p. 4. 

accordance with a time-table to be agreed upon by 
France and Tunisia. 
BIZERTA: While not contesting Tunisia's sovereignty 
over Bizerta, France shall negotiate with Tunisia a 
new status of Bizerta before the regrouping of the 
French troops now in Tunisia. 
AIUFIELDS: Neutral observers shall be stationed 
at the four airfields in South Tunisia--Sfax, Gafsa, 
Gab~s and Remade--to see to it that these are used 
only for peaceful purposes. 
CONSULATES: Certain French consulates in Tunisia 
which were closed in February may now be reopened. 
EXPELLED FUENCH CITIZENS: The Tunisian Government 
will reconsider individually the case of all the 600 
French citizens "removed" from their residences in 
Tunisia, a~d will decide whether it is safe for them 
to return. 7 
It is perhaps of little importance to discuss the essential 
moderation of these proposals, or, .as Nurphy himself does, 
to point out that de Gaulle's later agreement with Tunisia 
was less favorable to France than his own proposals in 
analyzing the anti-Americanism that dominated the Assembly 
on April 15. The hostility of the Right, as Le Monde 
immediately suggested, was less the result of the good 
offices than the conviction that the mission worked against 
48the Government. The execution of the good offices and of 
Gaillard's Government had been decided in advance of the 
Assembly meeting. 
On April 15, both came under attack. Pierre Andrt of 
the Independent party directed his fire at the Government. 
France's position in the Sakiet affair had been "perfectly 
47Quoted in Werth, The De Gaulle Uevolution, p. 31. 
48Le Monde, April 17, 1958, pp. 1, 2. 
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defensible." " ••• (I)f you (Gaill~rd) had fully accepted 
your great responsibility, you never would have accepted 
what the good offices proposed to you. ,A9 
Thro~ghout the debate, it was suggested that Gaillard's 
support of the Murphy Plan resulted from foreign pressure. 
At one point when Gaillard denied this, a member of the 
-Right interjected: "Come on, you'd better read Ike's letter 
to us!" Soustelle's attack was more direct: 
M. Soustelle: After the failure of the "good 
offices", the only thing that would explain the 
Government's present policy is Eisenhower's letter. 
(Loud cheers on extreme &i ht and on numerous 
Right and Center benches. 
M. Gaillard: That's penny novelette stuff! 
M. Soustelle: So you say you haven't yielded to 
outside pressure? 
M. Gaillard: I have not, and I repeat it. 
M.Soustelle: The fact is that you've obeyed a 
summons, and this will happen again. Where, I ask 
you, is Fregah policy decided--in Paris or in 
Washington? 
Towards Murphy and the good offices mission, Soustelle 
was equally severe: 
The good offices were only justified if they dealt 
with the question of Tunisian neutrality. But from 
the beginning the partiality of ~W. Murphy and 
Deeley toward Bourguiba's Tunisia was evident. The 
good offices were rapidly transformed into mediation, 
and then, it must be said, into arbitration exercised 
against-us. The pr~blem of belligerence was 
49Journal Officiel, D~bats Parliamentaires, Assembl'e 

Nationale, April 15, 1958, pp. 2140-41. 

50Quoted in Werth, The De Gaulle Revolution, p. 34. 

Some passages here have been condensed. For full exchange 

see Journal Officiel, D~bats Parliamentaires, Assembl'e 
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completely left aside. If M. Murphy had exercised 
on M. Bourguiba a hundredth of the pressure he put 
on the French government, M. Bourguiba would have 
been oblised to renounce his belligerence against 
France. ~Very good! Very good! from several 
benches5~f the center, the right, and the extreme 
right. j 
The good offices mission, he argued, was the first step to­
ward abandoning Algeria. Could anyone doubt Algeria's 
importance? 
Remember the lessons of the Third Republic. It 

tolerated the loss of the Rhineland, then the 

Anschluss, then Munich. And this ended" with the 





It was nqw American diplomacy that threatened the repetition 
of these lessons. Soustelle exploited the theme of anti­
Americanism thoroughly and decisively before the debate had 
ended and the good offices' recommendations had been rejected. 
By extending good offices, the United States had hoped 
to avoid straining its friendships with France and Tunisia. 
This it had failed to do. Worse still, no conclusion was 
brought to the French-Tunisian conflict. "The Americans 
have sown money and gathered abuse, without securing any 
progress towards a solution," The Economist reported. 53 
Instead, a crisis had been precipitated in the French regime. 
The coalition that defeated Gaillard--the Right and the 
,
51Journal Officiel, D~bats Parliamentaires, Assemblee 
Nationale, April 15, 1958, p. 2145. 
52Ibid ., p. 2147. 
53"France's Misdir~cted Fury," The Economist, April 19, 
1958, p. 187. 
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Communists--would not work together to form a new govern­
ment, and it was not certain from what quarter a new gov­
ernment would appear. "You are going to open up a crisis. 
How lorig will it last?" Gaillard asked the Assembly moments 
before his government was overthrown. It lasted longer than 
any cabinet crisis of the Fourth Republic. In fact, the 
regime never recovered. 
Hardly anyone c~uld have been shocked at the failure of 
the good offices mission; from the outset observers had pre­
dicted a less than even chance of its success. Americans 
were suprised, however, by the tremendous hostility unleashed 
towards the United States during the Assembly debate over the 
54good offices' proposals. 
It should be remembered foremost, in judging the French 
reaction to the good offices, that, rightly or wrongly, the 
United States did not represent a neutral conciliator to the 
French. There is no single historical moment of antagonism 
to which one may turn in order to locate the sQurce of French 
animosity and distrust. The war experience, i.e., American 
treatment of de Gaulle, had not been forgotten by the depu­
ties in Parliament. Indochina presented a more recent source 
of suspicion. Andre ~ Morice, who stood ideologically next to 
Soustelle in the debate of April 15, says: 





The French, and I was among them, took badly the 
interference of the United States in an affair 
(Sakiet) considered at the time as a French affair. 
Let us not forget that this came after a clumsy 
United States policy in Indo-China where, instead 
of helping the French, the Americag~ did their best 
to com,plicate every problem•••• 
That was the Right's impression of Indochina; the United 
States, by its lack of cooperation, was held partly respon­
sible for French defeats there. Closer still to the Sakiet 
incident was the Suez affair, another French maneuver favored 
strongly by the Right. Had American pressure to abandon the 
expedition been withheld, "not only the Nasser problem would 
have been settled, but also the problem of French Algeria.,,56 
These events provided a general background for shaping 
the attitude of the French Right tow~rd the United States. 
The sensitive North African issues furnished a more specific 
and immediate framework. Soustelle claims that the irritation 
he felt towards the "so-called" good offices mission arose, 
above all, from "the incomprehension of our allies in the 
Algerian affair."57 
Several occurrences ~n 1957 indicated to the French 
that a definite view on Algeria was evolving in Washington. 
In July, John Kennedy made a long and pointed speech before 
55Andr: Morice, Correspondence with the Author, see 
Appendix. 
56Ibid • 
57Jacque Soustelle, Correspondence with the Author, 
see Appendix. 
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the Senate, highly critical of France's Algerian policy: 
The war in Algeria, engaging more than.400,000 
French soldiers, has stripped the continental forces 
of NATO to the bone. It has dimmed Western hopes 
for a European common market, and seriously compro­
mised the liberalization reforms of OEEC, by causing 
France to impose new import restrictions under a 
wartime economy.58 
He also challenged American reluctance to consider the 
Algerian problem in any terms other than as an exclusively 
French concern: 
The war in Algeria confronts the United' States with 
the most critical diplomatic impasse since the cr1S1S 
in Indochina--and yet we have not only failed to 
meet the problem forthrightly and effectively, we 
have refused to even recognize that it is our prob­
lem•••• 59 
Kennedy's speech made an impression among policymakers both 
in Washington and in Paris. The sympathy he showed for the 
cause of Algerian independence was understood by many in 
France to represent the opinion of American officials less 
free to express themselves. 
In November, M. Bourguiba appealed to the United States 
for arms after his request had been ignored by the French 
Defense Ministry. When the United States and Britain respond­
ed by rushing several thousand rifles and machine guns to 
Tunisia, the French interpretation of Kennedy's speech seemed 
to have been confirmed. In France, the reaction was violent 
58Congressional }tecord, 85th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 103, 
yt. 8 (July 2, 1957), 10781. 
59 Ibid ., p. 10780. 
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and indignant--the press unanimously condemned the Ang10­
American arms shipmcnt while representativcs of every po1it­
ica1 position repeated the question, Had France become less 
important than Tunisia? France's own policy toward Tunisia, 
which hoped by restraining Tunisia to favorably influence 
the Algerian struggle, had been punctured publicly by the 
action of her allies. The conclusion drawn by France from 
the incident was more than just a hypersensitive French 
reaction, for The Economist saw the same meaning in the arms 
shipment: a warning that Washington would not put up with 
Franc~'s North African policy much ~onger.60 
Yet the incident was apparently not meant to be a 
warning at all. It resulted instead from a decision based 
on several mistaken assumptions: that if Bourguiba did not 
get arms from the West he would turn for help to the Soviet 
Union, and that the weapons would be u.sed only to protect 
. 61 
Tunisia against the infiltration of Algerian fel1aga! 
With a curious lack of perception, the American and British 
Governments had failed to anticipate the effect their move 
would have on France. Probably it was the hint of Communist 
arms that had caused Washington to react without consideration 
for its ally. 
60"French Pride and Prejudice," The Economist, 
November 23, 1957, pp. 690, 692. 
61Curtis Cate, "Ambassador Murphy's 'Good Offices,'" 
The New Republic, April 21, 1958, pp. 5-6. 
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The Tunisian arms shipment had been a blunder, not a 
warning. Kennedy came much nearer the truth than did The 
Economist when he suggested that the United States was not 
at ali prepared to face up to the North African problem. 
American behavior at the December NATO conference in Paris 
made this clear enough. Since all but two of France's 
fourteen divisions had been diverted from Europe to Algeria, 
one might have expected discussion of this disruptive phe­
nomenon at a conference called for the ann6unced purpose 
of recementing the shaken NATO alliance. Instead, the United 
States agreed to leave North Africa out of the deliberations. 62 
The "French Algerians" saw enough evidence in Kennedy's 
speech and in the shipment of arms to Tunisia to confirm 
suspicions that America would soon be applying pressure for 
an Algerian settlement. It was. whispered in Paris during the 
NATO conference that the imperialistic Americans were after 
Algerian oil. Contrary to this impression, the arms ship­
ment and the NATO conference indicate the position Washing­
ton would actually take regarding the Sakiet bombing, and 
they point at the same time ~o one of the gravest problems 
of American foreign policy of the period. The United States 
was attempting to pursue a middle way between diplomacy and 
62 Ibid .; Curtis Cate, "NATO and North Africa," The New 
Republic, May 5, 1958, pp. 7-9. In Raymond Aron's opinion, 
the United States lacked leadership; see R. C. Doty, "As 
NATO Meets: What Europe Says of Us," The New York Times 
Magazine, December 15, 1957, pp. 61-62. 
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force. Fundam~ntally, it was trying to avoid policy. This 
above all was "the reason for the preordaine~ barrenness of 
Mr. Murphy's mission," Curtis Ca.te wrote in The New Republic. 
He added: 
When anything goes wrong in the world, the Admin­
istration is tempted to believe that things can be 
set right be sending out a good will ambassador 
who will charm the conflicting parties back into 
benevolence and concord. • • • This attitude--it 
cannot be called a policy--deserves to be called 
the Dale Carnegie approach to power politics•••• 
His 04urphy' s) mission has perhaps been the purest 
example we have yet been offered of6~uhlic relations 
as a substitute for foreign policy. 
Considering the good offices mission as a public rela­
tions venture, some attention must be given to the image of 
the American representative, Robert Murphy. Christian 
Pineau, in deeming his appointment to have been "insensi­
tive,H64 presents a rather widely accepted view that demands 
some exposition. 
The reputation that Murphy had earned from his wartime 
activities was particularly unsuited to appease Gaullist 
circles in 1958: 
They attributed to him an attitude hostile to the 
General's person, from the fact that he was 
President Roosevelt's representative and that his 
personal activity had been deemed, in 1944, favor­
able to General Giraud.o, 
63Cate , "Ambassador Murphy's 'Good Offices, ttl p. 6. 
64Christian Pineau, Correspondence with the Author, 
see Appendix. 
65 Ibid • 
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De Gaulle himselr placed Murphy high on his long list of 
adversaries and despised him to the point of hatred. When 
Murphy requested a meeting with de Gaulle, after coming to 
66Paris,·he was coldly refused. Determining the attitude of 
the Right toward his appointment required little speculation 
on Murphy's part. Immediately upon arriving in Paris in 
February, he read an article by Michel Debrl, one of the 
representatives of Gaullist opinion, which suggested in 
effect that he return home immediately.67 As Schoenbrun 
puts it: tiThe Gaullists howle¥d with rage, and a wave of 
"68
anti-Americanism swept over France. 
The indiscretion of Murphy's appointment was a reflec­
tion of Washington's failure to consider the importance of 
rightist animosity. " ••• One may say that between 1947 
and 1957 anti-Americanism in France passed from the Left to 
the Right," Alfred Grosser has written. 69 This shift was 
brought about chiefly by American failure to support the 
Right's two favorite programs: the Suez policy and Algerian 
"pacification." But the United States remained oblivious to 
66David Schoenbrun, The Three Lives of Charles de 
Gaulle (New York: Atheneum, 1966), pp. 125, 231. 
67Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, pp. 395-96; Murphy, 
Correspondence with the Author, see Appendix. 
68Schoenbrun1 The Three Lives of Charles de Gaulle, 
p. 	231. 
69Quoted in Furniss, France, Troubled AllX, p. 301. 
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the emerging hos~ility from the Right, and continued to 
interpret all anti-Americanism by the standard formula-­
. Communist agitation. 
The Communists did, of course, adopt their familiar 
anti-Government, anti-American line during the debate of 
April 15, and they voted solidly. against the Murphy-Beeley 
recommendations. But the most vehement attacks came from 
-the Right. Moreover, since the success of Gaillard's coali­
tion government depended upon the support of the Right, not 
of the Communists, their vote was unimportant. A vote of 
affirmation was never expected from that quarter. These 
facts should have been blatently obvious, especially to 
Murphy because of his closeness to the events. Yet, in 
several addresses given by him after returning from Europe-­
on May 19 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and 
on July 1 at the 1958 Colgate Foreign Policy Conference in 
New York--he blamed Soviet propaganda for exciting the anti­
American sentiments in France. 70 
In one sense, Hurphy's war credentials were well suited 
for the good offices mission of 1958. During the war he had 
restricted hi~self to the role of reporting conditions in 
Algeria. He shunned policymaking. 71 Obscurity, derived 
70Robert Murphy, "Review of Recent Anti-American 
. Demonstrations," The Department of State Bulletin, XXXVIII 
(June 9, 1958), 952-61; Robert Murphy, "Basic Elements in 
United States Foreign Policy," The Department of State 
Bulletin, XXXIX (July 28, 1958), 141-46. 
71 Funk, Charles de Gaulle, pp. 90-91. 
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from avoidance of policy, characterized his war image. 
Robert Aron has called him "that most enigmatic of diplo­
matists." "Indeed," says Aron, 
he'was so enigmatic that he gave every appearance 
of puzzling himself. This curious man often gave 
the impression of not understanding the issues 
involved; perhaps this very fact enhanced his rep­
utation. He was everybody's friend. Right wing 
with the Right, Left wing with the Left, he reflect­
ed all the prejudices and errors of American' 
diplomacy. Indeed, ~~ net only reflected them, 
he exaggerated them. 
Aron, referring here to the war period, might easily have 
been speaking of 1958. MurFhy again represented the Adminis­
tration's approach yar excellence. 
In his book, The De Gaulle Revolution, Alexander Werth 
tends to equate the unpopularity of the good offices with the 
unpopulari ty of Robert 14urphy, stressing the extreme distrust 
that Murphy's image delineated. 73 But this is to place'too 
much blame on the American Ambassador. After all, he was, as 
has just been stated, an admirable representative of Washing-
ton's position. 
Many Frenchmen involved in the events of the good 
offices mission concur in the opinion that, while Murphy's 
appointment was imprudent, he does not deserve to carryall 
the responsibility for the French reaction but might best be 
seen as an additional factor of antagonism. Although Pineau, 
for example, considers Murphy's choice to have been an 
12Robert Aron, France Reborn, p. 216. 

13Werth, The De Gaulle Revolution, pp. 22-24, 30. 
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insensitive one, the fact remains that tlany other choice 
would have also brought reservations with it," for the good 
offices mission itself "seemed to (the Gaullists) an attack 
on French sovereignty in the form of an Anglo-American in­
trusion in an affair considered a purely national matter. tt74 
This impression is confirmed by Andrl Morice, L&on Delbecque, 
Pierre Pflimlin and Andrt Philip, as well as by Alfr~d 
75Grosser and Raymond aron. Exactly how decisive a role he 
played in the failure of the good offices mission--and thus 
the fall of the Gaillard Government and even the downfall of 
the Fourth Republic--is a matter more open to disagreement. 
Opinion varies from Grosser's conclusion that his role wa~ 
indeed decisive to Aron's judgement that it was, in the end, 
of little importance. 76 Perhaps all these men could Agree 
with Schoenbrun's dictum: 
In the greater scheme of things Murphy was only a 
small pebble among the many boulders on the rocky 
road of French-American relations. But it was the 
kind of small pebble which gets inside a man's shoe 
and causes a pain and a stumbling out of all pro­
portion to its size and importance.11 
74Pineau, Correspondence with the Author, see Appendix. 
75Andrt.Morice, L'on Delbecque, Pierre Pflimlin, Andr: 
Philip, Alfred Grosser, Raymond Aron, Correspondence with the 
Author, see Appendix. 
16Grosser and Raymond Aron, Correspondence with the 
Author, see Appendix. 




. It may seem suprising that some of those, whose 
attacks on Murphy were the most clamorous in 1958, go the 
farthest today in releasing him from censure. Who would 
expect.to hear Soustelle say that "The personage of Mr. 
Murphy was not concerned" in "the attitude of a great many 
members of Parliament and of myself towards the so-called 
'good offices' mission ••• tI?18 And Andr: Norice, who 
sharedSoustelle's opinions in 1958 now writes: 
If ~r. Nurphy's good offices mission became a 
stalemate, this is not due, according to my think­
ing, to Mr. Murphy's personality, a personality 
which we have no need to discuss. If anyone other 
than Mr. Murphy had been placed at the head of this 
delegation, he would have done 'no better.19 
These statements indicate a rather remarkably congenial atti­
tude toward Murphy when compared with the views being ex­
pressed by the same men in April, 1958, and they would appear 
to indicate once again that the denouncements of Murphy can­
not be taken too literally. The issues of animosity were 
larger than one man's personality. 
No American representative would have been very well 
received. Perhaps Ministers and members of Parliament remem­
bered Murphy's past, but most Frenchmen had forgotten it. 
Yet, public opinion was no less skeptical of the good offices 
mission than the French Government. "It is thus not Mr. 
78Soustelle, Correspondence with the Author, see 
Appendix. 
19Morice, Corr·espondence with the Author, see Appendix. 
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Murphy's presence at the head of the good offices mission, 
which explains the mistrust of a part of public opinion and 
the hostility of another part towards this mission_ H80 The 
source of hostility was to be found in the French interpre­
tation of the mission "as an underhanded attempt (by the 
United States) to internationalize the Algerian conflict. u8l 
The concern here is not with the truth or falseness of 
the French view, but with an American style and an American 
representative that encouraged distrust needlessly be their 
approach to diplomacy. To prove that French suspicions were 
groundless (as they probably were) does not vindicate the 
United States. The Administration, anxious to playa dual 
role in the Franco-Tunisian conflict of holding the NATO 
alliance together on the one hand and sympathizing with Arab 
nationalism on the other, tried to walk on neutral ground 
where there was none. While Kennedy's speech was at least 
useful to the French in exposing an American position that 
could be appraised openly, the Administration's noncommittal 
attitude only complicated an already equivocal situation. 
Probably no other diplomatic approach by the United 
States was better suited to aggravate the suspicions and 
xenophobia already present in France. At the same time, it 
accomplished nothing. In positive results, the good offices 
80Delbecque, Correspondence with the Author, see 
Appendix. 
81 Ibid • 
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mission was barren, maturing a crisis without precipitating 
solutions.. The Franco-Tunisian dispute continued. The war 
in Algerii was no nearer a solution. No stand had finally 
been taken by the American Government towards Algeria, a 
problem vital to its own interests~-indeed, the whole purpose 
of the good offices mission had been to avoid that kind of 
decision. American "meddling" had only confused and infuri­
ated Frenchmen unnecessarily. At every level of consider­
ation, the good offices mission of 1958 can be. understood as 
an indication of Washington's unpreparedness to define a 
policy towards North Africa or to face up to the true com­
plexity of the political situation in France. 
CHAPTER IV 
DE GAULLE RETURNS 
After the establishment of the Fifth Republic, there 
was a tendency among Americans to lose sight of the fact 
that Franco-American discord had predated the new regime 
and to blame de Gaulle entirely for foreign. policy diver­
gences. "Because they tended to judge other nations in 
terms of individual personalities rather than their historic 
interests," Walter LaFeber comments, "Americans tended to 
believe that Franco-American agreement would be fully 
1
restored whenever de Gaulle departed from the scene." 
It was not exclusively an American reaction to turn 
to the figure of General de Gaulle when searching for the 
source of further disparity in the French and American 
positions. Duroselle wrote in 1964: "It is beyond doubt 
that the role of the General in the ~reation of this 
(Franco-American) tension is of major importance, if not 
totally responsible. 2 
1Yalter LaFeber,America. Russia, and the Cold War, 
1945-1966 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), 
p. 237. 
2Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, "De Gaulle's Designs for 
Europe and the West," Changing East-West Relations and the 
Unity of the West: Papers Presented to the European­
American Colloquium, May 1 and 2, 1964, at the Washington 
7) 

Yet there was more than a modicum of truth (and 
warning) to be found in Jean Cauls observation that 
"De Gaulle does not exist. He is just the idea the French 
have about themselves.") After years of discord, de Gaulle 
did not forge domestic concensus solely on the basis of his 
personal prestige and without regard for French interests-­
as too many Americans imagined. Stanley Hoffmann deems it 
a "basic, obvious fact: the personal style of the General 
gives its special shape to a policy which, in its aspirations 
and connotations, corresponds to French desires.,,4 Even 
Duroselle did not suggest that agreement would be restored 
after de Gaulle's rule had ended. Duroselle distinguished 
between de Gaulle's tactics and his overall strategy, or 
long-range views. Were it only Gaullist tactics that provid­
ed the source of friction, conflict could pass with de Gaulle. 
But the long~range goals which made up de Gaulle's program 
and which had the support of the French also conflicted 
violently with the Atlantic policy of the United States. 5 
Center of Foreign Policy Research, School of Advanced 
International Studies The Johns Ho kins Universit , ed. by 
Arnold Wolfers Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), p. 
111. 
)Quoted by Henri de Turenne, "Grand Subject," The New 
York Times Magazine, September 12, 1965, p." 114. 
4Stanley Hoffmann in the Foreword to Alfred Grosser, 
French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle, p. xi. 
5Duroselle, "De Gaulle's Designs for Europe and the 
West," p. 191. 
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French dissatisfaction with the Atlantic Alliance did 
not begin with de Gaulle's return. Alfred Grosser suggests 
two elements which made Atlantic solidarity a "reluctant 
choice" for the French under the Fourth Republic. The first, 
mentioned above, was "the element of anti-Americanism spring­
ing from a feeling of dependence ••• " The problems of 
decolonization--the loss of Indochina and the Algerian war-­
heightened the sense of dependence for they were accompanied 
by a feeling that France was declining while the United, 
States was rising. 
The second element of malaise involved in the 
Atlantic choice was based on the impression that 
the United States would not guarantee French secu­
rity when certain actions, rightly or wrongly dee~ed 
essential to French security, ran counter to 
American policy--such as the Suez expedition in 1956 
and even the Algerian war. 6 
Thus, as the feeling of dependence increased, the impression 
that French interests would be protected by this dependence 
decreased. 
This analysis is useful in interpreting the response 
of distrust and anti-Americanism to the 1958 good offices 
mission. Specific incidents; such as Eisenhower's letter, 
as well as the mission in general, stimulated both elements 
of malaise. The feeling of dependence was blatantly demon­
strated by Soustelle's performance in the Assembly, and 
particularly with his question, "Where, I ask you, is French 
6Grosser, French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle, p. 7. 
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policy decided-':"in Paris or in Washington?" Simultaneously, 
the tenor of the letter and the very fact of the mission 
suggested that French interests would not be guaranteed by 
the United States. 
It is not suprising, then, that criticism of American 
diplomacy in the Franco-Tunisian dispute continually went 
beyond the specific issue of the good offices mission--the 
larger concern was with the Atlantic Alliance system. When 
Soustelle complained of American willingnes~ "to sacrifice 
its European allies in its ridiculous search for Arab friends, 
lest they fall under Communist influence,"7 he was calling 
into question the validity of Ameri.can foreign policy in 
general as it related to French interests. 
What were the aims of American policy? Since the 
Second World War, the United States has relentlessly pursued 
two goals in its foreign policy: the first is anti­
Communism; the second is the defense of peace. In the 
second chapter, I emphasized primarily the clumsimess of 
of American attempts to impress its interests on France and, 
in the third chapter, the essential shallowness of American 
foreign policy. These two points are related by their inter­
connection with American goals--in particular, by the 
enormous American concern with C~mmunism. 
7Quoted in Alexander Verth, De Gaulle: A Political 
Biography (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1967), p. 12. 
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The United States, unlike its allies, made anti-
Communism the guiding principle of its foreign policy. Vhat 
sort of a program could be constructed on the principle of 
anti-Communism? Duroselle claims that the United States did 
not develop an ideology after the war; rather it built a 
counter-ideology in reaction to Communism. 8 Whatever label 
is applied, -the results of the American policy of reaction 
have been several. 
The firs·t can be seen in the poverty of American 
foreign policy. I have described the good offices mission 
as an anti-policy effort. As such~ it was more representa­
tive than unique, for when Washington was not confronted 
with a clearcut case of Communism versus anti-Communism it 
found itself in the uneasy position of not knowing what 
its interests were, or if it had any special interests. 
Only when reacting to or anticipating what it viewed as a 
Communist advance did Washington move with self-assurance. 
And the overbearing enthuasism shown by the United States 
when attempting to secure itself from Communism often 
offended and antagonized France by its tactlessness and 
narrow vision, by the lack of concern shown for alternatives 
which might have incorporated the additional interests of 
of its ally. Such was the case of the EDC debate in 1954. 
8Duroselle, "De Gaullets Designs for Europe and the 
West," p. 182. 
77 
An anti-Communist counter-ideology, if nothing else, 
has proven to be too narrow a base for the construction of 
an entire foreign policy. The real complexity of foreign 
affairs, brought about by the separate national interests 
of the United States and its allies, defies reduction to 
such a restrictive framework. In an article entitled "The 
Impotence of American Power, 'I Hans Morgenthau wrote in 1963: 
••• (O)ur impotence is aggravated and rendered 
irreparable by our commitment to ariti-Communism as 
the overriding objective of our foreign policy. 
For most of our allies, anti-Communism is at best 
incidental to concrete national objectives and at 
worst irrelevant to them •••9 
What is more, anti-Communist policy insists on the primacy 
of its goals at all times. 
Conflicting analyses of the Communist danger underlay 
much of the disparity in French and American foreign policy 
aims after the mid-fifties. The extension ad absurdum of 
the United States commitment to anti-Communism can be seen 
as a second adverse result of its counter-ideology. For a 
time, especially during the period of Stalin's provocations, 
'Communism appeared as a menace to the national interests of 
all Western powers. The threat diminished by the mid-fifties 
however, and as one might expect, national priorities in 
France shifted; but not in the United States where a pro­
gram of anti-Communism had become the key to maintaining 
peace in the world. The United States clung to Manichean 
9Commentary, November, 1963, pp. 384~86. 
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interpretations of the cold war, like those of President 
Truman or John Foster Dulles; its view of the world remained 
limited to the contest of forces of good and evil as it 
10battled the Communist ogre. 
In France, this view lost its vitality by 1955. The 
French public became less concerned with Communism than with 
protecting French independence from the United States. One 
public opinion survey reveals that while until October 1954 
approximately the same number of Frenchmen ~anted France to 
remain committed to the West as those who wanted her to be 
uncommitted, by June 1955 Frenchmen chose to side with 
neither the East nor the West in a ratio of three to one over 
those who preferred commitment to the West. This ratio 
seldom fell below two to one during the remainder of the 
Fourth Uepublic. 11 
As the Soviet menace subsided, it was the American 
presence, not the H.ussian, that confronted Europeans. The 
concern generated by this revelation was already evident 
during the Fourth Republic, but by the sixties it had vir­
tually turned into Americanophobia. Etiemble's best-seller, 
Parle-vous franglais?, owed its extraordinary success to 
1°Duroselle, "De Gaulle's Designs for Europe and the 
West," p. 182. 
11Richard L. Merritt and Donald J. Puchala, eds., 
Western Euro ean Pers ectives on International Affairs: 
Public Opinion Studies and Evaluations New York: Frederick 
A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968), p. 220. 
79 
12the virulent anti-Americanism that it represented. Anti-
Americanism was a reality of the Fourth Republic; the Fifth 
Republic made it into a virtue. 'W. W. Kulski points out 
in his -book on de Gaulle that French patriotism "today is 
colored by anti-Americanism as for many past decades it was 
colored by a strong Germanophobia. n13 The intensity of 
Americanophobia was well expressed by Maurice Duverger in 
an interview in 1964: 
It must be said, it must'be written--the sole near 
danger for Europe is American civilization. There 
will be neither Stalinism nor communism in France. 
All that is a scarecrow that no longer frightens 
anyone but the sparrows. From.1946-48, in 1952, 
there was still a communist danger, but today all 
that appears past. In contrast, the pressure of 
American society, the domination of the American 
economy, the invasion of the American mentality-­
all that is very dangerous. 14 ­
American domination directly contradicts the central 
foreign policy objective which France has sought to realize 
under both the Fourth and the Fifth Republics: the resump­
t~on of a status worthy of her historic mission. The basic 
foreign policy objectives of the United States and France 
12Grosser, French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle, p. 
140; see also John Ardagh, The New French Revolution, Harper 
Colophon Books (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1969) 
pp. 264, 458. 
13V• W. Kulski, De Gaulle and the World: The Foreign 
Policy of the Fifth French Republic (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1966), p. 77. 
14Georges Suffert, ttEntretien: Maurice Duverger," 
L'Express, March 5, 1964, pp. 39-40. 
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not only differed in the fifties and sixties but conflicted-­
both countries chose leadership roles. And the philosophical 
bases on which their respective objectives were justified 
disagreed as well. 
The French desire since the war to recover its rank 
has never been a goal supported by the United States. In 
the forties and fifties it seemed a romantic impossibility; 
in the sixties, when it was possible, it ..ra.s denounced as 
anachronistic. The reason is clear. With its attention 
riveted to what it perceived to be the creeping danger of 
Communism, the United States judged the continuance of its 
presence in Europe to be mandatory for the duration of the 
East-West conflict. This presence has not, of course, been 
seen by the United States as a matter of domination, but 
r.ather as a matter of protection under American leadership. 
But it demanded the support and, it must be said, the sub­
mission of France to this leadership. General de Gaulle, 
who chose to reaffirm French independence whenever possible 
instead of looking to American guidance, was frequently the 
subject of vehement American criticism, his actions deemed 
tantamount to treason. Now, in Grosser's words, 
the United States is in a position at least as anach­
ronistic as the anachronism France is allegedly 
guilty of. In constantly reproaching General de 
Gaulle for his refusal to submit to a majority vote, 
American opinion has displayed an altogether dis­
armingly clear conscience, in view of the American 
inability even to conceive of the fact that true 
Atlantic equality would require American submission 
to majority decisions. The incomprehension here is 
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total, for American leaders and the American public 
find it inconceivable that the United States should 
los: itf5full sovereignty in matters of decision 
mak1ng. 
For de Gaulle, France's ~entral objective was neither 
unrealistic nor undesirable. He had been the first to 
formulate that objective while he headed French government 
in 1944-46, and since that time support of his view had 
grown. By 1958, he 
was not untypical, but on the contrary character­
istic, of Frenchmen and of many other Europeans 
in wishing to diminish political and strategic 
dependence on the United States a§ soon as economic 
dependence was no longer a fact. 16 
And circumstance was on his side, for economic dependence 
had in fact greatly decreased by 1958. tfDe Gaulle not only 
desired the revival of France: he rightly saw that it was 
happening. tl17 Contrary to what has often been assumed 
abroad, French economic recovery, "Though overshadowed by 
the crises of colonial wars and by weak, shifting 
Governments," was solidly underway by 1958.18 To the credit 
of the Monnet Plan, not de Gaulle, a'new mood of innovation 
and belief in progress also pervaded French industry, 
15Grosser, French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle, 
p. 135. 
16peter Calvocoressi, International Politics Since 
1945 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 135. 
'17 . ~ 
Ibid., p. 133. 
18Ardagh, The New French Revolution, pp. 6-7. 
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playing a vital role in the French revival. "'When de Gaulle 
returned to power in 1958, the recovery of industry was well 
advanced and output was rising rapidly.1I19 
France had rebuilt her ruins and she had regained much 
of her self-esteem by 1958. This change offered a new free­
dom of perspective in reviewing the Atlantic Alliance. And, 
after the Algerian war was concluded in 1962, de Gaulle's 
freedom to act was also grea.tly increased. 20 Greater 
independence was no longer an impossible dream. Why did it 
gain popular support? . As has already been mentioned above, 
the later events'of the Fourth Repuplic--the Suez affair 
and the Algerian war--convinced a growing number of French­
men that reliance on the United States did not necessarily 
guarantee the success of policies believed to be vital to 
French security. 
And then, from a strategic point of view, dependence 
was no longer an entirely satisfactory solution. In the 
case of a nuclear war, an overwhelming majority of French­
men preferred by 1958 to remain neutral. 21 Not without 
reason. Raymond Aron, in 1963, explained the French concern: 
To begin with, European cities are open to strikes 
by medium range missles, of which the Russians have
• 
19~., pp. 6, 15. 
20Duroselle, "De Gaulle's Designs for Europe and the 
West," p. 173. 
21Merritt and Puchala, eds., Western European Perspec­
tives on International Affairs, p. 224. 
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a large number, while cities in t'he United States 
can be hit only by ICBMs, still relatively rare 
according to the United States experts. Further­
more, raising the atomic threshold might, in lay­
man's language, mean that war could be fought on 
European soil and devastate that continent while 
the territories of both the United States and the 
Soviet 'Union were spared out of a desireA strategic 
or moral, to prevent extreme escalation.~2 
There was a further strategic consideration: the American 
deterrent remained almost exclusively under American com­
mand, an arrangement Americans were not easily persuaded to 
change. To General de Gaulle, "Atlantic interdependence" 
appeared to be "sheer :window dressing, barely veiled hypoc­
risy designed to camouflage Europe's reduction to political 
'23
vassalage by the United States in the guise of protection." 
The French concern over her inequality in decision making 
was not simply a sign of frustration or humiliation at her 
less prestigious position. The Cuban missle crisis of 1962, 
in which France was in reality only kept informed of the 
evolution of events, made it clear that France could become 
involved in a nuclear war without her own choosing--without 
even participating in the decisions that brought the war 
about. 
The advantages of dependence were not 'easily discerned. 
American national interests ~ook precedent over those of 
22Raymond Aron, The Great Debate: Theories of Nuclear 
Strategy, trans. by Ernst Pawel, Anchor Books (Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965), pp. 76-77. 
23l...-b;d., pp. 168 •... , 169 
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France. And, when considering the East-West conflict, the 
"protection" offered by the Atlantic Alliance could be seen 
as either irrelevant or dangerous: if the Communist threat 
had passed, protection was no longer needed; if it had not, 
the Alliance was more apt to make a target of France than 
provide a shield--and that with France having little voice 
in the matter. Even had a substantial movement in France not 
existed ever since the war to re-establish French independ­
ence and leadership, there would have been serious reasons 
by the early sixties for reconsidering France's dependent 
role vis-~-vis t"he United states. 
The point is that de Gaulle was not needed in order 
to make these problems evident to the French. Even less 
was he voicing only personal concerns when he spoke out on 
these issues. kather, de Gaulle's long-range goals were 
anticipated by the French; his own conception of a nation's 
rights and his analysis of the world situation provided a 
philosophical basis for what the French already believed. 
De Gaulle's fundamental foreign policy goal after 
taking office in 1958 was "to achieve equality within the 
Alliance, while awaiting the day when the world will no 
longer be divided into two blocs.,,24 
Considering first his insistence on French equality, 
in de Gaulle's concept, France as a great nation must have 
24Grosser, French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle, 
pp.118-19. 
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the freedom to follow its own interests. This view basically 
disagreed with the idea of American leadership in a "Grand 
Design" policy. Henry Kissinger, one American observer who 
has recognized the divergence in the two positions, comments: 
Consequently, the dispute between France and the 
United states centers, in part, around the philo­
sophical issue of how nations cooperate. Washing­
to~ urges a structure which makes separate action 
physically impossible by assigning each partner a 
portion of the over-all task. Paris insists that 
a consensus is meaningful only if each partner has 
a real choice. Therefore, each ally must--at 2 
least theoretically--be able to act autonimously. 5 
By stressing the importance of nationalism, de Gaulle was 
Dot opposing the coordination of We~tern policies. "Con­
vinced that only those capable of assuming responsibility 
can form meaningful associations, he can logically affirm 
his faith in the Atlantic Alliance while insisting on the 
identity of Europe and the uniqueness of France.,,26 A 
political unit that means nothing to itself can have no 
meaning to others. On this basis, de Gaulle sought real 
participation for France in the Atlantic Alliance. 
His view again differed significantly from that of the 
United States over the issue of bipolarity: 
In General de Gaulle's view, it is true that the 
East-West conflict exists, but it will not be eter­
nal, and nothing must be done that would prevent a 
25Henry A. Kissinger, The TrQubled Partnership: A 
Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance, Anchor Books (Garden 
City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966), p. 46. 
26Ibid ., p. 62. 
change on the world chessboard in case of a detente 
in the East-West conflict. In the American view 
••• 	the East-West conflict will constitute the 
major 	axis of world politics for a long time to 
come: to worry about what will happen afterward 
is in 	the realm of prophecy and not politics. 27 
This' last quotation from Grosser suggests what is per­
haps the most fundamental disagreement between the Gaullist 
outlook on the international scene and the American. De 
Gaulle always maintained a historical perspective. It is a 
historical lesson that nations outlive ideolgies, that con­
flicts end, and de Gaulle did not forget to apply this lesson 
"to the East-West conflict. When he spoke, for instance, of 
"the Atlantic Alliance currently necessary to the defense of 
the free world" in his message to Parliament on December 11, 
1962, he was not prophesying but expressing an awareness of 
28the process of change. 
But it is just this kind of awareness that is foreign 
to the American mentality. One might say that Americans do 
not think historically. If it is one of the great weaknesses 
of the Marxian interpretation of history to bring the dia­
'lectic' process to an end, it, is the even greater weakness of 
the American interpretation never to acknowledge the histor­
ical dialectic. How does this relate to American foreign 
27Grosser, French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle, 
p. 	114. 
28Note quoted in ibid. 
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policy? Earlier it was suggested that the two principal 
goals of American foreign policy since the war have been 
the defense of peace and anti-Communism. Neither of these 
goals could have taken the form they did without American 
resistance to historical thinking. 
Consider first the American conception of peace: 
The United States has a tendency to believe that 
peace and stability are "natural.1t Crises must, 
therefore, be caused by personal ill-will rather 
than by objective conditions. If tension persists, 
it is because Communist leaders continue to be un­
reasonable; it can be ~lleviated by establishing an 
atmosphere of trust and good personal relations ~9 
by a change of heart on the part of the Soviets. 
This view applies no less to the United States attitude 
toward de Gaulle than it does to East-West relations. And it 
completely ignores historical perspective; stasis is the con­
stant, change an invading and evil force. American policy 
envisages a world "where all conflict has ended and nations 
live under 'the rule of law. ,,,30 This might be an admirable 
ideal, but Americans have yet to distinguish between the 
ideal and reality. Here, it might be added, de Gaulle's 
view has been more historical. Peace to him "is achieved 
not by personal reconciliation but by the establishment of 
'l'b'a more s t abl e equ1 1 r1um. ,,31 
Again, the connection between anti-historical thinking 




and the pre-eminent position of anti-Communism in American 
for6ign policy seems s~ basic that ODe wonders whether the 
latter could exist without the formera'-or at least whether it 
could be taken with such seriousness. The radical present­
mindedness of the American view--the unwillingness to look 
back or to look ahead--Iends to the view of international 
relations s~ggested by Henry Kissinger in the quote above 
and by Walter LaFeber at the beginning of this chapter: 
crises are brought about, not by historic events such as the 
clash of national interests, but by individuals bearing 
personal antipathy toward the United States. Communist 
leaders proved to be the most reliable and convenient antag­
onists, but the General as well was seldom above suspicion. 
De Gaulle's historical perspective removed him from 
one-diminsional ideological commitments. He believed that 
the bipolar structure had originated at a specific date (the 
Yalta Conference) and he was equally convinced that it would 
not continue forever. Whatever misjudgements he might have 
made here, he at least had the historical acuity to recog­
nize that the latest major world division did not ipso facto 
infer a final world ordering. This recognition, however 
obvious it might seem, was by no means trivial since he made 
it the basis for evaluating the state of world affairs. It 
gave him the freedom and the incentive to plan for France's 
future at a time when. most world leaders' concerns were with 
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day to day events. For American policymakers, on the other 
hand, the bipolar order was more readily seen as permanent. 
A central policy of anti-Communism confirmed and perpetuated' 
that permanence. 
All this suggests basic differences in the French and 
American positions, both in national interests and in per­
spective. The primary concern of this paper has been with 
Franco-American discord under the Fourth Republic, but it 
does not seem irrelevant to have moved, however briefly and 
generally, beyond 1958. The central pollcies and perspec­
tives on both sides indicate continuum rather than movement 
in new directions, but at the same time a sharpening of 
focus so that the conflicts of the fifties can be more 
readily understood. Certainly American concern with Commu­
nism did not begin in the sixties; neither did French concern 
over its independence versus American "leadership" begin at 
the time of de Gaulle's return to power. 
How does one pin down the sources of Franco-American 
conflict? Does one begin with Roosevelt's French policy of 
1944, with his personal animosity for de Gaulle and his with­
holding of recognition, ~s Brinton suggests~32 But that 
would imply that criticism of American diplomacy should have 
eased during the Fourth Hepublic when the General had dis­
appeared from public view--a time in which anti-Americanism 
32Brinton, The Americans and the French, pp. 78-79. 
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was developing solid foundations. Or does one look, with 
LaFaber, to the disagreement over Germany's position in the 
postwar world?)) As Grosser points out, however, "we (the 
French) go virtually from 'no enemy, but Germany,' in 1944, 
to 'no friend, but Germany,' in 1958." Germany and Algeria, 

the two countries with which France shared the most suffer­
. ing, were in the sixties the two countries with which France 

ma1n alne d lons. Y t . t' d pr1vl"1ege re1a t' )4 e tho1S t ransf ormat'lon 
in Franco-German relations did not see a parallel in Franco-
American relations. 
The search for roots is perhaps a pointless game. If 
one insists, however, on locating the source of Franco-
American discord, it is not likely to be found in any specific 
event or series of events. Of the EDC debate over German 
rearmament, which seemed to be tearing France apart in 1954 
and to threaten permanent damage to Franco-American relations, 
what was remembered by 1958? It is in the separate attitudes, 
rather, out of which grew the postwar policies of France and 
the United States to combat Communism--that the real roots of 
discord might be discovered. 
It is not just that interests conflicted but that, as 
differences became more marked, the two countries were not 
33LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966, 
pp. 9, 48-52 • 
. 34Grosser, French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle, 
pp. 6, 45. 
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equally free to follow their own concerns. Specifically, 
France found that she was not as free as she might have 
supposed of American guidance. Being dogmatically commit­
ted to its ideology {or counter-ideology} and thus working 
in the realm of absolute rather than relative truths, the 
United States for its part could not allow--could not 
conceive of--France or any other ally having separate 
interests. Such interests could only indicate conspiracy 
or misdirection. The accusations and hostility directed at 
de Gaulle, often for nothing more than his courage to speak 
up for French interests, reflect the extent of American 
incomprehension. 
Anti-Americanism became more explicit under de Gaullets 
foreign policy but it certainly did not begin there. It is 
the weakness of American thinking that would hold the person­
ality of the General responsible for the disintegration of 
Franco-American relations. Disintegration was inevitable 
perhaps from the moment the United States assumed that French 
interests would naturally and invariably coincide with 
American interests--that is to say, from the beginning. 
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APPENDIX 
On the following pages I have included the letters 
that I quoted from or, for one reason or another, found 
interesting or valuable. I regret that two letters which 
have been particularly helpful in shaping my opinion--those 
of ~W. Michel Debr~ and Pierre Mend~s-France--could not be 
quoted or included her,eby request of their authors. I had 
very much hoped to receive a letter from M. Gaillard and the 
, . 
letter of M. Dourges-Maunoury has been entered only because 
it indicates that Gaillard planned to write. His unfortunate 
death this spring, however, came before he was able to reply 
and closed the door on the possibility of discovering his 
impressions of the good offices mission. Of the men whose 
letters I considered to be of greatest value, ~he political 
positions of Jacque Soustelle and Andr' Norice have already 
been indicated in the text. Christian Pineau was, at the 
time, the Socialist Minister of Foreign Affairs. L~on 
Delbecque was a Gaullist on the staff of Jacque Chaban­
Delmas, the Minister of Defense. He provided a link between 
the discontented military chiefs and the revolutionary French 
in Algeria. Andre/ Philip was a Socialist and a devoted 
"European"; Pierre Pflimlin was also a "European" and chair­
man of the Movement r6publicain populaire (MRP). He pulled 
together a short-lived government in May that stepped aside 
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for de Gaulle after the crisis of May 13. 
The questions to which the Frenchmen responded were as 
follows: 
1) Should the unpopular reception of the good of­
fices mission be attributed entirely to French atti­
tudes whi.ch predated the bombing of Sakiet (in par­
ticular, the suspicion that thB United States would 
attempt to involve itself in the Algerian situation, 
a ~trictly French problem), or did the image of Mr. 
Murphy himself influence French opinion of the good 
offices? Were his activities from the Occupation 
period remembered? Did his appointment serve to con­
firm doubts about the mission? Did it create new 
doubts? Might someone else have engendered more 
confidence? 
2) Had the good offices mission been handled dif­
ferently, or had someone other .than Mr. Murphy repre­
sented the United States, might the Gaillard Govern­
ment have resolved its differences with Tunisia? 
Could it have eventually solved the Algerian problem? 
Can Mr. Murphy or the good offices mission reasonably 
be held responsible for contributing, directly or 
indirectly, to the fall of the Fourth Republic? 
Herve Alphand is an exception. He was the French Ambassador 
to the United States and Dulles had conferred with him about 
the Sakiet bombing. I was curious to know whether Dulles 
had discussed various possible candidates with him before 
making the Murphy appointment. As his letter indicates, 
however, Dulles had not. From Murphy I wanted to know 
(1), how he came to be appointed, (2), how he felt at the 
outset of the mission about its value and its probable suc­
cess, and (3), whether he believed that groups on the Right 
were also involved in arousing anti-Americanism in France at 
the time of the good offices mission. 
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MINISTERE REPUBLIQUE FRAN<;AISE. 
DES 
AFFAIRES ETRANGERES 




Par lettre du 10 mars 1970, vous m'avez pose, a 
propos de votre travail sur tl. hobert fJiurphy et sa mission 
en Tunisie en 1958 i diverses questions concernant l'attitude 
du gouvernement frangais a l'epoque. VOllS desiriez en particuliel 
savoir si Ie e;ouvcrnement frD.n<;ais avait ete consu1te au sujet 
de 1e designl::ltion de M. Murphy et que1les avaient ete ses 
reactions. 
J'ai l'ho~qeur de vou~ faire savoir que Ie gouvernement 
frangais n'a pas ate consulte par Ie gouvernement des Etats-Unis 
avant 1a nomina t.; ion ,~e iii. Murphy at done qu I il n I a pas eu a 
se poser les diff&ren~es questions mentionnees dans votre lettre. 
Veuillez agreer, I~ionsieur, 1 t assurance de ma conside­
ration distinguee.j. 
M. Lorin Anderson 
18}1 S.W. Park Avenue 
Portland, Oregon 97201 




DE l'EOUCA nON NATIONAlE 

6, rue de Tournon. 6' (Meet, 39·00)ECOLE PRA TIGUE ( et 85046)
DES HAUTES ETUDES 
Selence. [conomlquea et Soclole. 
Centre de Soclolog;e I::uropeenne 
Monsieur Lorin ANDERSON 
PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY 
Division of Social science 
p. O. Box '151 
PORTLAND, ORE 97207!USA 
Cher Monsieur, 
J'ai bien re91 votre lettre du 10 mars. 
n nlest pas facile de donner une reponse categorique 
aux deu:", questions que vous me posez; les remarques wivantes 
traduisent mes impressions de l'epoque et rien de plus; de 
toute maniE~re, la mission de M. Murphy n 'aurait pas r6ussi 
p:rrce que l'opinion fJ.'aw;aisc souP90nnait les Etats-Unis d'inter w 
venir dans Paffairc algerienne, consideree comme concernant 
exelusivUlnent la Frcil1Ce. La personnalite de M. MUHPIIY creait 
un obstacle sUj)plementaire sur la. voie du succes, en raison 
du rOle qu'll avaH jou€: pendant la guerre et de ses relations 
avec Ie Gouvernemellt de Vichy. Cependant, i1 ne s 'agit la 
que d 'un detail sans grande importance. 
D'aucune manlE':!re Ie gouvernement Gaillard 
n 'aurait pu regler Ie probleme d 'Algerie. 
Croyez. je vous prie, a l'assurance de mes 
sentiments devoues. 
fLay') ~-
Raymond ARON . 
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67, RUE LA eOETIE.PARIS VIII~ 
Ie 16 Avril 1970 
Monsieur Lorin Anderson 






J'ai bien regu votre lettre du 31 mars 
dernier , je l'ai transmise it mon ami Felix Gaillard q'.li etait President 
d'J. Conseil a l'epoque des b::ms offices at q'li est a meme de rcpo:1dre 
a vos questions d'uue maniere plus precise que moi-meme • 
Je VOliS prie de croire , Monsieur at 
mes sentiments les meilleurs . 
103 LltON DELBECQi..!E 
31, RuF. DU POINT C£NTR"L La 25 A~ 1970 
89-TOURCOING 
Monsieur' LORIN J..r.rnERSON 
1831 S.W. Perk-Avenue 
App. 507 PORTHAND 
OREGON 91 201 
U.S.A. 
Char V.onsieur, 
En ~ponse a. vo1:ra J.ettre, ve\l:i.l.J.ez 1:rouver ci-apres 
queJ.quos notes concernan1: J.a mission -bons offices· do Monnieur 
MURPHY en 1958. 
La personneJ. parJ.ementa.ire at, bien entendu, J.es min:i.s­
tres se Douvena.:i.en1: du rOJ.e qule:va.it joue Nonsieur MURPlfY, en 
1942, en Uriqua du Nord. Llopinion pUbJ.ique J.lavaii; oubJ.ie. 
Ce n I est donc pa.s J.a presenoe de, )\lODS ieur 1·;uRPHY a J.a td'te de J.a 
mieaian de bona oi"f'i.oes. qui explique J.a m.~ :f'iance d I u."'lO partie 
de J.topin:ion pubJ..ique e1: J.lhoGtllita dtune autre partie e. J.le­
gard de cEd;'l;e mission. 
Bien avant J.e bombardement de SAKIET, J.a pJ.upart des 
ha.n9e.is considera.:ient Honaieur BOURGUIBA - qui hebergeai1: en 
Tunisia uno forte ar~e du F.L.N. oJ.ger:ien et J.n:isse.it cotta 
armee attaquer J.es noaitions fra.n~a.iaeB de J.a frontiers - comma 
J.a oompJ.ioe e.u m':lins passif de J.a rebellion aJ.gerienno. En fai.t, 
Monsieur BOURGUIBA etait m3me aoouse de bellig6ranoe. Il'impor­
tait donc peu que oe rot r'Ionsieur mJP..PHY qui :inter'rlnt dnns J.e 
differend franoo-tunisien. Ii I importe queJ. aut::-e mediateur aura.it, 
dons J.es oirconstanoea d1aJ.ors, susoite dee reactions sombJ.abJ.es. 
IJ. est difficiJ.e de d~re a~, d~fferemmant menee, J.a 
mission :r.iI1RPHY-BEELEY aurait reusai a. apa.i.ser J.aquerelle i'ranco­
tun:is~onno. Llun des probJ.emea eB8ent~p~s etait en ei"£et ~e re­
tabJ.isaement d I una situn.tion normale e. J.a frontiere. I'lona~eur 
MURPHY ne pouvai.t resoudre un te~ probJ.eme aJ.ors que Honeieur 
BOURG-UIBA J.u.i-~me en eta.it ~nca;pabJ.e. On ne Toit dono pa.s oom­
ment uue mission de bons offioes aurai.t pu eviter de buter sur 
oe point. 
. IJ. est certain en outre que J.' :intervention de I,Jl;t. MURPHY 
et BEELEY f'ut :interpretee en Franoe oomma une tentat~ve sourno:Lse 
•.•1 •.. 
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d t inter:na.tiona.l.isa-;iotl du oon£1.it eJ.gerieno L t opinion, dans sa 
majoritt;, se rebe:Llai:'c oontre uno intrusion etrangere dana une 
a:ff'aire qui, pour elle, ctait une affaire interieure fran<;aiso 
these dta~leurs soutenue avec persevGranoe devant ltO~N.Uo par 
les representants du Gouvernemento 
Prise en oe sens, on doit admettre qua ~a mission MURPHY 
a. preoipita 10, ohutf) de ].a Qu.'l.trie:r.o Repub1ique" En slaooroohani: 
a. olle, Honsieur F6],i:r. GAILLARD a. en e i'i'et donne 1 t impression que, 
m.a1 reso.lu a m:..inten:i.r la souve!"'air.ete i'ra..'1Qai se sur l'Algerie, U 
s t engageait par un detour dans la voie de 1 t abandon at de l'inter­
dependanoe dans .le dOl.1aine des A:i:faires Etrangoreso Deja, au sur­
plus, oenai.ns mil.ieu.x politiques envisageaient le retour du Gene­
raJ. de GAlI"LLE qui PI?Z eai t pour un farms partisan de l'Algerie 
f'ranQaise et de l'Ind~penda.noo nationale. 
I En oonclusion t la mission de Ivlonsieur HURPRY f'Ut un des 
~lemento qui perroirent J.taccfltration du prooessus de regroupement 
des dii'i'erents oourants Hatio::laux et aussi la chute du Gouverne­
ment GAILLARD. Le vide politique et la g;rande orise qui s'en sui­
vit f'irent le reste. 
Esperant que cas elementa TOUS aideront dans votre tra.­
vo.il., je vous prie d'agreer~ Char Nonoieur, l l ex;pression de mes 
~entiments distingues. 
FONDATION NATIONAI.E UNtVERSITI! DE PARIS 105 
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CYCLE SUPJ::RIEUR D'i;':TUDES POLlTI9UES 
C".ner Nonsieur, 
Je voua r~:,:,:,rc'.e d~ votr!! lettre. J' aVOn!! qu.e co que je dir:: d1:!1ls mon 
H-,re !Jur 1n DIO Re:mbliqc;o 'Jot r.·lue 'h~,"?oth?t.iq1le r.U.C v1:rifi6. n fr·udrdt ff':i.re 
une etude d';? prc~$:c at qu·:-lz:r.t~s i.n.tcrvie~"s de pe1"~$o:·'!;alitC:s. 
l'~n tout c,~.c, j'ai encore rodit 1:: r:on cours cette a:'nee Que je 
creyeis offectivO":C!1t ~~le J.c: sctlvt!!1ir des man":'r:?',',res de r. I·iU1.~'1Y en i (H2 En'C'it 
eM un mndic:l.p OU01!,l~r::entdre !:lour la mbsion de bons offices. 
Votl"e dcu:.'!:ic:;;e (IU(Hltton 11e P?U'; rccevoir una r6[.onsc nct'cc. ~::1 en ost 
r~~\1i,t =n..!.'x hY:?Ot!lt:::-~S. ~Te 1')') ~~!":':!~ts de vous rer..vl'):~er AU c~;J1tre uJlJ,.,,,:6ric" d~..,s ::ton 
livre sur In Politjr:ut') sxt:Sricurc de III VO RC::Hlb1.i'1ue. Je VOUO rnppclle ci.~'pl,~nent 
<luP. Ie conflit I::.vec -i:>. Ttmi::;i~ a 6te ar.aise, d:c::s 10 !lens scur.eite !l,:;,.r ;.;. G.ULLARD, 
de::; l'arriv,;o du G:?n6rd de Gnulle au pOllvoir. 
FiMltt'lont m:l r'~ronse a votrc toute dernicre question e:Jt un oui 
ties forme. 
Je VO'lD prie de creire, cher Nonsi~r, a roes rneilleurs S(;!:tj!~cnts. 
t/fr-
Alfred G?OSSER 
0.'•• 1r,o:-in Y-:Y·;;so:r 
1831 S;:l. Fa!'k Avenue, Apt 1= '507 
1\.":';'1,;\ "I), Oree;on 97201 
U.S.A. 
COMPAGNIE 
PAHIS, Ie 12 Nai 1970 lOtS 
MESSAGERIES MARITIMES 
12. BOUI..EVARO DE I..A MADEI..EINE 
Cher r'.onsicur, 
'Je m'excuse de ne pas avoir repondu plUB 
tat a votre lettre iu 31 Nars 1970, mais je ne 
reviens que maintonant d'un grand voyage en 
Afrique du Sud. 
S1, du fait des fonctions que j'ai 
exercees au 1':aroc, je. suis assez competent en ce 
qUi concerne les affaires cnerifiennes, je ne Ie 
suis P,lS du tout en oe qui concerne les affaires 
tunisiennes. 
Ce que je crois c'est que Ie choix de }!onsieur Nurphy a I' epoque de Sakiet n' a pas ete 
heureux. 11ais ce que je crois .§galement c I est que,
de toute fa90n, aucur. des gouvernements de la 
IVe Republique n'aurait etc capable, autrement 
que p~r l'octroi de l'independance, de regler
l'affaire tunisienne. 
Le Maroc et Ie Tunisie ayant obtenu leur 
i.ndependance, le·p:cobleme de l'affaire a'Algerie 
ne pouvait pas ~tre a mon avis regIe autrement 
qu'il lla ete. L'exceptionnel merite du General 
de Gaulle est d'avoir pu accord~r son indopendance
a l'Algerie sanR qulil en resulte en mctropole des 
troubles extr~~ement graves, tout en adoptant des 
dispositions ~ui ont permis de regler dans les 
moins mauvaises conditions possibles Ie tres 
serieux probleme du reclassement, en metropole,
des fran~ais d'AIgerie. \' 
Je voua prie d1agreer, cher ~~nsieur, 
l'express1on de mes sentimentsd~stingucs et les 
meil·leurs. '-..." \ 
Monsieur Lorin ANDERSON 
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Les qu~stions que vous me posez dans votre 

lettre du 31 Mars ne sont pas de mon ressort. 

Fortoment r ... tenu a ALGER par les oxigences 

concr(~ tes d 'une terrible charga:- faire vivre at acheminer 

vers la paix un pays de IO millions d'habitants rorme 

de communautes ethniques violemment opposees, je ntai 

pas connu la mission MURPHY. 

M. MURPHY 'tait en rapport direct avec Ie Presi­
dent du Conseil des Hinistres, H. Felix GAILLARD ~e 
Ministre des Af'faires Etrangeres; il a vUten plus/de nom­
breuses personnalites de son choix. 
Peut-otre aurait-il pu me rencontrer avec 

profit pour lui et pour moi. II ne l'a pas fait. Je Ie 

regrette at me suis demand' alors si les raisons de son 

attitude ue devaient pas Ihre recherchees dans une igno­

rance voulue de certains aspects de la realite Algerienne 

et un parti pris delibere. 

Veuillez agreer, Cher Monsieur, avec mes­
sincures regrets, l'expression de mes sentiments tres 
. distingues. 
-
Monsieur Lorin ANDERSON 
1831 S.W Park Avenue, Apt • .507 
PORTLAND- OREGON 97201 
Office· Universitaire de Recherche Socialist~Og 
86, rue de Lllie - PARIS (7.) • Tel. 555.08.60 
Paris, le 23 avril 1970 
Cher Monsieur, 
J'ai bien re~u votre lettre et regrette 
tr~s vive.ment de ne pouvoir vous apporter quelque 
information valable dans votre enquete. 
Je n'appartenais pas au gouvernement de 
l' ~poque et n' ai pas ete info·rme des difficultes 
rencontrees par la mission de M. r-turphy. 
Le seul jugement que je puisse formuler 
en tan:t que parlementaire est qu'il ne serait ~as 
raisonnable de tenir M. Murphy ou la mission s1 pau 
que co Goit responsablc aans la. sulte des evenements 
et plus particulierement dans la chute de la IV~me 
Republique. 
Veu1llez croire, cher Monsieur, en mes 
meilleurs sentiments. 
Guy MOLLET 
Monsieur Lorin ANDERSON 
1831 S.W. Park Ave, Apt 507 
PORTLAND, Oregon 97201 
(U.S.A.) 
109 ANORl't MORICE 
PARIS. LE" "10 avril 1970._ 
Centre Elysee:; Bretagne 
4, avo FrarJdir.. R~'osc"clt, 8erne. 
Cher 1.10nsieur, 
Jlai lu av(~c interet votre lettre du 31 mars 1970. 
Je veux bien reSpondrc brn~vement, de mon mieux, aux questions 
que vous posez. 
Tout d'abord, je suis un ami des Etats-Unis d'Amerique 
et ai toujours souhait~ que lea relations entre la France et les Etats­
Unis se situcnt 8U.' Ie plan de la plus grande a:miti€. Jc suis alle a 
plusicurs reprises aUK Etats-Unis, recemment encore - i1 y a 3 mcis­
et je m'y trouve toujours dans des "milieux particulit-rement sympa­
thlques. Done ce que je vais eairerepcut 4Hre tax':; d'inamiti~ cnvers 
lea Etats-Unis, alors que je me sens tres attache au peuple ameri­
cain, 
Voyons rpaintenant Ia reponse. 
Si la mission de bons offices de M. Murphy s'eat 
traduite par un llchec, eela n' est pas cla, seion moi, a ia person­
naiite mame de M. Murph,-, personnalite que nous n'avons pas II 
discuter. S1 un autre que M. Murphy cut etc place a la tete de cettc 
delegation, il n'eut pas fait mieux. 
Lea FranlSais, et j'etais du nombre, ant mal pris 
l'immixt1on des Etats-Unis dansune a!.faire qui etait considerce 
a l'epoque comme une affaire fran~aise. N'oublions pas que cela 
venait apl'Qs une politique maladroite des Etats- Unis en Indochine, 
ou, au lieu d'aider les Fran;;ais, les Amerieains ont complique de 
leur mieux tous le·s problemes, alors qu'il etait de notre interl!t 
comm'.1n de travailler ensemble. En ce qui cone erne le Viet-Nam, 
et la suite ddes t;venements Pa prouve, les Americains ayant 
travaille is. chasser les Fra..'l<;ais d'Indochine, s'y sent installes et 
ont heritc de toutes les dHficultes presentes. 
... / 
/ ... no. 

Meme maladresse americaine dans l'affaire de Suez. 
Je mien suis d'ailleurs explique al'epoque avec l'adjoint au Secre· 
taire d'Etat a Washington. Si, '1U lieu d'exercer cette pression sur 
les F'ran'iais et les Anglais pour les faire abandonner l'expedition. 
on nous.avait laisse les 1'T'.ains libres qu(;>lques jours encore, non 
seulement le problezne Nasser etait regIe, mds aussi Ie probleme 
de l'Algerie franyaise. Au lieu de cela, les Americains ont fait 
pression sur nous pour nous faire la.cherl'expedition en son beau 
milieu, Quvrant ainsi la porte aux difficultes au Moyen-Orient que 
nous connaissons depuis. 
Nous savions bien, en ce qui cc>ncerne l'Algede, que 
les formules de jad:s n'etaient plus valables et qu'il faudrait en 
arriver a un accord. Mais tout ceci eut pu lltre fait sur une distance 
de plusieurs annees au lieu d'@tre precipite et se traduire finalemmt 
par de la honte et du sang. 
Dans 1a mission Murphy, ce n'est pas M. Murphy qui, 
personnellement, porte toutes les Tesponsabilites. crest Ie fait 
m@me de cette mission qui a ,he une intrusion dans nos (),ffaires 
frant;aises et qui, tout ell declarant qu'il .s'agissait d'arranger lea 
choses, n'a fait, au contraire, que les compliquer en precipitant 
les eve-nements et en faisant passer l'affaire d'Algerie et de 1a 
Tunisie du plan frant;ais au plan international au tout ne pouvait 
que se dissoudre. 
Voila quelques renseignemcnts qui, je l'esp~re, 
repolldront. a \'otre demande. 
Pour conclure vous me demandez si 1a mission de 
M. Murphy a contribue direr.tem~nt ou inc1irectement a la chute 
de la IVe Re publique. Je pense qulil serait injuste de faire porter 
cotta respollsabilite a M. Murphy. La mi!lsion Murphy a cte, si 
vous Ie voulez, un element de ph~s qui a contrib";le a l'avenement 
de 1a Ve Republique en France, mais elle n'en a pas etc l'el~ment 
motour ou determinant. 
Je vous prie d'agreer, cher Monsieur. l'assurance de 
mes sentiments les plus distingues. 
Monsieur Lorin Anderson 
1831 S. W. Park Avenue, Apt• .-f-: 507 
Portland, Oregon 972.01 
CORNING GLASS INTERNATIONAL 
__----~~~~~Jrl 
. PORTlAND ST t\IE IJNiV~:::SITY 
I FACILITIES PLANNING 
II rEDIG 1970 
RECEIVED 
FILE 
AOSCAT O~ MURPHY 
Chairm.on Of t". Board A O(~i.io" of Corni"g 0.$". Works Cabf. Add~e5!J: "COFt~GLA5S"" 
February 12, 1970 
Mr. Lorin Anderson 
Portla.~d State University 
P.O. Box 751 
Portland, Oregon 97207 
Dear Mr. Anderson: 
I take pleasure in ackno.rledging the receipt of your un­
dated letter addressed to me at my Washington address, which I 
have just received. 
I am glad to answer the questions you put as follows: 
1) I came to be appcinted to the task. of U.S. represen­
tative to. a scod ot'fi.(',.,~ te:m consisting of Sir Harold Beeley of 
the British Foreign Office a.nd myself, because the French Govern­
ment had requested such an Anglo-American Good Offices mission 
after the French Airforce had. bonbed the Tunisian vilage of Side 
Sakiet. At the t:L"'lle rr~ job was Deputy Un,der Secretary of State 
for Political Affairs, Department of state, VIashington, and I was 
designated for this task by the then Secretary of State, Dulles, 
and President Eisenhower. 
2) Our Government was rather reluctant to assume this 
responsibility as that type of task is rather thankless. As in 
the case of most disputes a mediator enjoys the opportunity to 
be attacked by both parties 
3) .Actually some :;nembers of the Gaullist group in addi­
tion to the Commun5st element ,·'cre vigorously opposed to foreign 
intervention in the matter. On my arrival in Paris I remember 
being greeted by a scorching nei'ispaper article wit.h a byline by 
Michel Debre, subsequently Gaulli3t Prime l'linister, saying in 
effect tl'l..at Sir Harold and I 1'rere unwelcome volunteers and the 
best thing we could do would be to return home leaving the French 
to settle their c.m affairs. Up to that point they had not been 
very successful. 
I might add that if yOUI library happens to have a copy 
112 fo.1r. Lorin Anderson 
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of It book I wrote called "Dip1omr:>.t Among Warriors~ it conta.ins an 
account of the ~unisian affair in Chapter Z7. 
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Cher Monsieur, 
J'ai bien rec;u votre lettre du 31 mars par laquelle vous Ole 
demandez des rensfdgnements, sur la mission confiee en 1958 a M. Robert 
Murphy. 
Je ne dispose que de tres pau de renseignements sur cctte 
affaire car les problemes en question ne relevaient pas, a 1'epoque, de ma 
competence gouvenlementale. C'est donc uniquement en me basant sur Ie 
souvenir que j 'ai garde de propos recueillis a l'epoque et, sous tout~ 
reserv~lque je puis faire a vos deux questions les reponses suivantes :, 
1) Le prL'1cipe m~me d'une intervention des Etats-Unis dans 
l'affaire tunisienne etait conteste pa r de nombl'eux hommes politiques 
f!'anc;ais et au sei.n meme au Gouvernement. A tort ou a raison beaucoup 
de gens pensaiem que l'influel1ce des Etats-Unis dans les affaires 
d'Afrique du Nord risquait de s'exercer au detriment des inter~ts franc;ais 
tels qu10n les concevai.t a J.'epoque. Je ne crois pas que la persolmalite 
de M. Murphy ait etc a cet egard un facteur determina.nt. 
2) 11 est difficile d'irnaginer comment les evenements auraient 
evolue si la mission de "bons offices" 'entre la France et la Tunisie avait 
ete admise par Ie GOllvernement franc;ais et si eUe avait abouti a un 
resultat favorable. Personnellement je ne crois pas que, m~me dans l'hypo­
these la plus favorable, la cri.se algerienne aurait pu etre evitee. 11 me 
paraft inconcevable que l'on puisse tenir M. Murphy ou Sa mi,ssion comme 
responsable d'avoir contribue,directement ou indirectement, a la chute 
de la IV. Rcpubl ique. 
Veuillez agreer, cher lIiIonsieur, l'assurance de mes 
sentiments les meilleurs. 
Mr. Lorin ANDERSON 
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Paris, le 8 Avril 1970 
Lc President, 
Cher Monsienr, 
II m'est difficile de vous donner des renseignements 
sur une question que je n'si pas suivie de pres ct qui est, 
par ailleurs, fort lointai.ne. 
D'ur.e faqon generale, il est certain que l'idee 
meme de la mission de bons offices americains en 1958 
a suscite une resistance dans l'ensemble de l'opinion
publique frangaise, a la seule exception de ceux q\ti' 
qui etaient hostiles a In poli tiquc f:r'an9aise en Algerie.
Faisant suite a l'intervencion americaine, lors de l'expe~ 
dl.tion de Suez, cela apparaissait comme une intervention 
imperialiste des Etats-Unis, dans Ie domaine de la politique
mediterraneenne qui est, essentiellement, de competence 
europeenne. 
I;a designation de Mr. Murph"v a ete un facteur 
d'aggravation, car tous ceux d'entre nous qui ont ete 
en Algerie avec la France combattante, ont considere 
r.'r. !,~urph;t ,'t11!l-':'! un adversaire de la .F'rance dont les contacts' 
essentials dans 1e pa."s etaient les groupes sociaux qui
avaient, prealablemenc, col1abore avec les Allemands •. Maia, 
je ne crois pas que ce facteur, quelque deaagreab1e qu'il 
fut, ait ete decisif. Je crois qu'a ce moment la aucune 
intervention exterieure a l'Europe n'aurait pu jouar un 
role posi tif •. 
Veuillez croire, cher Monsieur, ames mei11eurs 
sentiments. ffL,rz 
Monsieur Lorin Anderson Andre Philip 






115 Christian PI~~AU Paris. le 10 avril 1970 
55. rue Val'lt)au 
PARIS (7·) 
Monsieur Lorin A!IDEHSON 
1831 S.W. Park Ave•• Apt 507 
PORTLAND, OREGON 97201 
CMr Monsieur, 
J'ai bien re~u votre lettre d~ 31 mars et vous prie 
de trouv~r en reponse une petite note sur 1a mission de M. MURPHY. 
Je crois sincerement qu'e11e correspond a 1a rea1it6 historique. 
Je reste a votre disposition pour tous renseignements 
complementaires. 
Croyez, cher Monsieur, ames meilleurs sentiments. 
NOTE sur 1a missi?n ce M. MURPHY dans l'affaire 
algero-t~nisienn8 
I - 11 est certain que 10. mission de M MURPHY (mission partagee avec 
un homologue britannique) a etc, en 1958, ffial accueillie par une partie de l'opinion 
publique fran~aise. 
La reticence a son egard tie-nt a deux causes principa1elO I 
a) sa persoqnalite 
b) la situation po1itique du moment. 
a) Les milieux gaullistes avaient conserve de M. MURPHY et de son activite 
a Alger un assez mauvais souvenir. 11s lui pretaient une attitude hostile a la 
personne du general, dm fait qu'il ctait Ie representant du President Roosevelt 
at que son activite personnelle aV8it ete jugee, en 1944, favorable au General 
GIRAUD. 11 est interessant de souligner l'hostili te particuliere de M. Michel DEBRE 
qui etait cense, en 19~8, representer l'opinion du General de GAULLE, contre Ie 
fait que la mission des bons offices ait et~ confiee a M. MURPHY. 
On peut done considerer que Ie choix de ce dernier a ete maladroit, 
encore que tout autre choix aurait comporte lui aussi des reserves. 
b) Les me~es milieux gaullistes sa pronon~aiont avec force, en 1958, 
pour l'Algerie frant;aise, contre ee qu'Us appelalent la "complicite tunisienne" 
avec Ie F.L.N., et pour l'exercice du "droit de suite", c'£-st a dire pour l'auto­
risation donnee aux troupes fran~aises de poursuivre les rebelles algeriens sur Ie 
territo1re tunisien ( ce qui a ete fait a Sakhiet). 
La mission de:> "bons offices It leur semblai t aloTs une atteinte a la 
souverainete fran<;;«ise, sous la forme d'une intrusion .anglo-americaine dans une 
affaire consideree comme d'ordre purE:'ment national. 
U'autre part les gaullistes avaient toujours denonce une soi-disant 
volonte des Etats-Uni~ de supplanter la France en Algerie. Ce qui a pu donner 
nalssance a cette supposition, c'est Ie fait qu'a maintes reprises des dirigeants 
amerieains ont manifeste leur crninte de voir l'Un10n Sovietique prendre pied en 
Algerie, Ie jour ou les Frant;aiS seraient partis, hypothese qutlls consideraient 
comma vraisemblable. 
L'e16ment paradoxa! de cette affaire reside dans Ie doublo )eu du 
Glneral de GAULLE; Celui-c1 ffi'avalt personnellement coufie, en octobre 1957 , 
. .../ ... 
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qu t il etait partisan de l'indepcncance de I 'Algerie I mais 11 cor..ptait, pour prendre 
Ie pouvoir, sur l'appui deS tenants de l'AIg6rio fram,ai,se. I.'exporience a verine 
l'existence de ce double jeu. 
II - 5i 18 mission dEn; "bens affices" s'etait exetcee dans d'autres conditions 
et avec d'autres hor.nes, Patrai.r!;: algedenn"" Qt par voi(! d,e consequence Paffaire 
tunisienne, n'auraient pas ete resolues pour autant. Le Gouvornement GAILLARD etait 
condamne, comc.e ses predecesseurs. parce que les fran~ais etaient las cia la guerra 
dtAlgerie encore q~'ils fussent divis's sur son issue possible. 
Les uns louhaitaient une solution de forca qUi aurait consolide la 
presence franljai se sans tenir coo.pte des aspirations des populations musulrn'lnes. 
Les au trsos etaient parti,«Hl!1 de l' abandon pur ot si:npl,e, negligeant ainsi les 
interHs des 1.200.COO habi tants d I or~gine europ.5enne qui. vivaient en Alg{;rie. 
, Au Parlement. gaullistes et cOIlll'llvnistes votaient, ensp.mble contre les 
gouvernements a la recherche d'un juste milieu. 
Dans de telles concti tions, 1a IVeme R,'publ1que etai t paralyse", dans son 
fonctionnement. 
11 seral t done injuste et exeessif d
' 
irr.j.)uter ~ 1a seule mission de 
M. MURPHY une chute II peu pres im?vitabh. Il y a dans l'Histoire des catalyseurs 
qu1 prckipitent une evolution mais qui ne sont pas responsables du resultat final. 
Neu/Uy, Ie '1 Mars 1970"Les IO£ES 118 
los HOMMES, 
Les FAITS" 
s.c. avenue do tlcu:U,. 
92-NEUlllY·SUiI.j;;£INE 
Mr. Lorin ANDERSON
'4':,: 'I2l',$4,10 1831 S.W. Park Avenue, Apt. 507 
PORTLA!!D, Oregon 97201 
U.S.A. 
Cher Monsieur, 
J'ai bien r!'!';l1 votre lettre du 10 mars et clest bien 
voJ.ont.iers ~e' jlessaierai de repondre succinctl?ment a voa ques­
tions. Je desire mer.tionner auparav,mt que m~s relations person­
neJ.J.es £.vec Robert l·l'.lrphy sont cordiales et que j'ai encore (,u 
le plaisir de dejeu."ler at de converser longuement avec lui a 
New York 11 y a quelque temps. 
lere Question Z Je crais que l'attitude d lUll grand nom­
bre de roembres du Parlement et de moi-meme a l'egard de la mis­
sion dite de "bons offices" apres Sakiet procedai't avant tout de 
1Ii~'itation ressentie par beaucoup devp~t llincocpr~~ensi,n de 
nos allies dans 1 I affaire algerienne. Les campa€;nes de pre3D'J 
pro-F.L.N. aux Etata-Onis, l'o.ccueil favorable r1serve a J:3W YO:til 
awe chefs terroristcs, certains discours comma celui du senatolll' 
et futur president J .J? Kenned.y, la politique di te lIant.i··colol'\ia~ 
lis-te" P~'~chge 11. \iashin!1:ton et a Londres, pr0voquaient en France 
de vives inquittuc!.es. Aussi bli1Lnait-or. le g01.l:....ernement Gaillard 
de donner :;.' impression o..u'::..l s I en l'emettait, pour traitel' U.l'l pro­
bleme de cette importance, So des al'bi·tres dont I' orientation 
eo.nnue paraissai t fixe9 d 'a:vance. La personne de 1-1. Hurphy n'e­
'tait pas en cause (sauf peut-~tre chez certnins gaulllstes qui 
lUi reprocn.ale-nt encore sa politique en 1942-43) t mais bien plu­
tat celle du Eritannique rI. Beeley, dont les tenda"lces systema­
tiquement pro·-arabes n' etaient pas ignorees. 
2eme Question: L1enisode de la mission des bons offices 
a ete finalement d'import~~ce mineul'e. Le gouvernement Gaillard 
n'aurait pas pu, avec ou sans cette mission, faire face a la si­
tuation en Afrique du l:ord. La deterioration du systeme politi­
que fran~ais e. cette epoque etai t bien trop profonde et irreme­
diable. Il serait done excessif et injust€ d'attribuer une res­
ponsabilite directe ou indirecte a N. Hurphy .)u a la mission dana 
la chute du regime. Celui-ci se sel'ait desagr~&e de toute m~~e­
re en raisnn de ses contradictions internes et de son impuissancE 
a resoudre les problemes de lloutre-mer. 
./. 
119 Veuillez agreer, cher Monsieur, l'assurance de mes 
sentiment~ les meille~rs. 
.--­
~~~ ~ques .SODSTELLE) 
